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The ability to acquire and use information superiority to enhance combat power 
and contribute to the success of military operations is a primary factor in the fulfillment 
of the tenets of Joint Vision 2020.  This thesis examines how various levels of 
information and information superiority affect strategy choices and decision-making in 
determining the payoff value for opposing forces in a classic zero-sum two-sided contest.  
The results show that if opposing forces possess options with equivalent strategic 
capabilities, the payoff advantage is determined by the quantity of choices from which to 
choose.  The degree of advantage in payoff for the force with superior information is 
determined by the amount of choices and the quantity of bad information for the 
opponent.  When a force possesses significantly fewer strategic options, more superior 
information is required to assume a payoff advantage, and for a force having more 
flexibility, significantly less information is required to affect an advantage in payoff.  
Additionally, we see that the effects of intelligence provides the greatest payoff 
advantage when a force possesses its maximum number of strategic options combined 
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This thesis examines the effects of various levels of information superiority, and 
its effects on the advantages of military forces over their opponents.  The research 
questions of this thesis address the potential benefits of the military’s capability to use 
information as a force multiplier.  The first research question addresses the value of the 
gain and loss of correct information that opposing forces possess and how it may affect 
potential outcomes of battle.  The second research question examines the information 
value and affects to opposing forces if the quantity of courses of action available to 
opposing forces is varied.  The third research question considers the value of the effects 
of intelligence on the decision-making of opposing forces in battle.  The fourth research 
question addresses the effects of the value of information by varying the capabilities of 
opposing forces. 
B. THE VALUE OF VARYING LEVELS OF INFORMATION 
The conceptual framework of the Armed Force’s Joint Vision serves as the basis 
for focusing the strengths of each individual service component to exploit the full array of 
available capabilities.  One of the most important underlying concepts of the Joint Vision 
is decision superiority and the value of information in defining force advantage, and in 
determining how decisions and choices of actions affect payoffs in battle.  This thesis is a 
continuation of work performed for the U.S. Army by Dr. Jerome Bracken and Dr. 
Richard Darilek of RAND’s Arroyo Center on the value of information.  Bracken and 
Darilek explore the concepts of how much information superiority is necessary for U.S. 
military forces to obtain a quantifiable advantage over their opponents in the coming 
Information Age.  Their research assumes that each force either possesses correct or 
incorrect information and that the knowledge of the decisions of an opponent were either 
known or unknown.  This thesis extends their research by considering the value of 
information superiority, and its affects on the outcomes of decision-making as the 
information is varied between totally correct and incorrect, and as the simulated battle 
matrices are changed from symmetric to varying degrees of asymmetry.  
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Following Bracken and Darilek, we use Game Theory as a methodology to study 
the value of various forms of information in military operations.  Specifically, zero-sum 
two-sided games are used, and each game includes both sides having three, five or ten 
courses of action available for achieving victory.  In addition to varying the type and 
amount of information available to the two sides, the effects of opponents possessing 
different numbers of potential courses of action is also considered.  Where Bracken and 
Darilek only use symmetric 3´ 3, 5´ 5 and 10´10 matrices, this thesis simulates battles 
using 3´5, 3´10, 5´3, 5´10, 10´3 and 10´5 matrices in order to represent the 
probabilities of victory or payoffs for asymmetric forces having different amounts of 
strategies and choices from which to choose.  The payoffs are generated using random 
numbers and are used to compute the averages of 1,000 trials for each battle simulation.  
Where Bracken and Darilek develop their payoffs using random numbers distributed 
uniformly between the boundaries of 0 and 100, this thesis simulates various levels of 
opposing force capabilities by using asymmetric payoff boundaries for the random 
number distributions. 
The simulated game battles are coded in Excel and Crystal Ball.  An example 
game matrix is shown below in Figure S.1: 
 xvii
 
Figure S.1. Example 3´3 Game Matrix. 
 
The above 3´ 3 matrix shows the Blue force choosing maximin row strategy 1 
with a value of 29, and the Red force choosing minimax column strategy 3, for a value of 
74.  The payoff of the game battle is shown at the intersection of row 1 and column 3, for 
a value of 74.  After 1,000 replications of simulated battle using numerous variations of 
the conditions for each force, the results are produced in the format of the following table 










Table S.1. Example Data for 3´3 Matrix With Red Force Degrading Info. 
 
3x3 Statistics 0 Bad 1 Bad 2 Bad 3 Bad 
Mean 48.68 54.56 56.85 59.99
Median 48.00 55.00 56.00 61.00
Standard Deviation 20.03 21.72 23.30 23.71
Minimum 3.00 5.00 3.00 3.00
Maximum 98.00 99.00 99.00 99.00
Mean Std. Error 0.63 0.69 0.74 0.75
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Figure S.2. Example Graph of Data for 3´3 Matrix With Red Force Degrading Information. 
 
Table S.1 compares multiple measures on the estimated average payoffs as the 
amount of bad (meaning incorrect) information for the Red force increases from 0 bad 
columns to 3 bad columns.  Figure S.2 shows how well the average payoffs align with a 
linear trend as the bad information increases. 
Six sets of experiments are conducted and over 100,000 evaluations of matrix 
game simulations are performed in order to ensure that the estimated average payoffs are 
as accurate as possible over a variety of situations.  The first experiment observes the 
effects of opposing forces in battle when possessing asymmetric strategy choices.  The 
experiment demonstrates that if opposing forces possess options with equivalent strategic 
capabilities, the payoff advantage is determined by the quantity of choices from which to 
choose, and the payoff value increases linearly in favor of the force with the maximum 
number of choices.  This suggests that flexible forces with more options have a 
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significant advantage even when they do not possess advantages in payoff or information 
superiority. 
The second experiment addresses the value of varying levels of information 
superiority between asymmetric opposing forces.  The degree of advantage in payoff for 
the force with superior information is determined by the amount of choices and the 
quantity of bad information.  When a force possesses significantly fewer strategic 
options, more superior information is required to assume the payoff advantage.  In 
addition, information tends to have a greater value and provide a larger payoff gain for 
less capable forces with fewer choices.  For a force having more flexibility and more 
strategies, significantly less information is required to affect an advantage in payoff, and 
superior information is less valuable and produces a smaller marginal gain for more 
capable forces. 
The third experiment considers the effects of intelligence on the payoffs of 
asymmetric opposing forces with common levels of information.  The results of the 
experiment demonstrate that intelligence provides the greatest payoff advantage when a 
force possesses its maximum number of strategic options combined with the opposition 
also having its maximum number of choices.  In the case where few options are available 
for opposing forces, intelligence provides minimal benefits to payoff advantage. 
The fourth experiment examines the combined affects of both intelligence and 
information superiority, also known as information dominance, on the payoffs of 
opposing asymmetric forces.  The results imply that on average, a force having 
information dominance produces a greater payoff gain when it has few strategies, and 
when its opposing force possesses significantly more capabilities.   
The fifth experiment shows the effects on the payoffs of varying levels of 
superiority and inferiority in the capabilities of asymmetric forces.  In the case of a force 
with increasingly superior capabilities, the use of the first superior option provides the 
largest payoff gain, and the benefits of additional good options level off thereafter.  In 
fact, the first superior option provides the highest advantage to the force with the fewest 
choices, versus the most capable opposing force.  The loss of force capability or the 
 xx 
increase in inferiority reduces the estimated average payoff most in the case when a force 
has its maximum number of choices and when its opponent possesses its minimum 
number of options.  However, the more choices present with the threat of bad 
information, the more the protection exists against just a few bad strategies, whereas if 
few options are present, inferiority has a higher negative impact on each strategy loss. 
The sixth experiment uses normal distribution payoffs to compare the estimated 
average outcome values to those of the uniform distribution.  This test suggests that the 
conclusions may be robust to other symmetric payoff distribut ions. 
The fundamental conclusion is that the benefits of various levels of information 
are dependent on numerous factors that affect a decision-maker’s choice of strategy and 
ultimately the payoff of battle.  These experiments reflect the effect of knowledge and 
capabilities on the likelihood of a successful outcome.  It is the goal of this thesis to bring 
to the attention of the reader the level of influence that the control of information has on 






1. Joint Vision 2010 
Joint Vision 2010 begins by addressing strategic changes and their implications 
for the Armed Forces in the near future.  The focus of the document is to promote an 
environment and mindset that begins preparing fo r an uncertain future.  One of the most 
important concepts stated in Joint Vision 2010 is that military leaders are in agreement 
that information superiority is among the most important enablers of victory.  It is also 
agreed that an understanding of the value of information is key to ensuring the maximum 
effectiveness and capability of the Armed Forces.[Reference 18]   
Information superiority is defined as the integration of offensive and defensive 
information operations; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and other 
information-related activities that provide timely, accurate and relevant information; and 
command, control, communications, and computers activities that leverage friendly 
information systems.[Reference 18]  For the year 2010, the goal of the Armed Forces is 
to improve the use of information by improving intelligence collection and assessment, 
modern information processing and command and control capabilities. By accomplishing 
this goal and achieving a state of information superiority, the military forces will be able 
to respond rapidly to any conflict in near real- time. 
As a result of the military’s improved capabilities to receive, process and 
disseminate information at an increasingly faster pace, day-to-day operations will be 
optimized with accurate, timely, and secure battlespace awareness information.  Vital to 
battlespace awareness is the cooperative effect of intelligence support combined with the 
force commander’s natural information assets.   
The Department of Defense is developing a complementary command, control, 
communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) 
network architecture that will facilitate the development of revolutionary information and 
intelligence capabilities, similar to the private sector becoming increasingly 
interconnected through the worldwide growth of internet communications.[Reference 18] 
2 
The six principal components of the evolving C4ISR architecture for Joint Vision 
2010 include:  
· A robust multisensor information grid providing dominant awareness of 
the battlespace. 
· A joint communications grid with adequate capacity, resilience and 
network management capabilities to rapidly pass relevant information to 
commanders and forces and to provide for their communications 
requirements. 
· Advanced command and control processes that allow employment and 
sustainment of globally deployed forces faster and more flexibly than 
those of potential adversaries. 
· A sensor-to-shooter grid to enable distributed joint forces to engage in 
coordinated targeting, cooperative engagement, integrated air defense and 
rapid battle damage assessment and dynamic follow-up strikes. 
· An information defense capability to protect the globally distributed 
sensors, communications and processing networks from interference or 
exploitation by an adversary. 
· An information operations capability to penetrate, manipulate or deny an 
adversary’s battlespace awareness or unimpeded use of his own forces. 
It is evident that our Armed Forces are truly dedicated to the achievement of 
information superiority and believe strongly in its advantages.  The word “superiority” 
implies an advantage in one’s favor.  In military operations, an advantage is transitory in 
nature and must be created and sustained through the conduct of training, exercises and 
operations.[Reference 18]  Similarly, the attainment and maintenance of information 
superiority will require the same level of attention since its achievement is not an end in 
itself.  Information superiority will only provide a competitive advantage when it is 
effectively translated into superior knowledge and decisions.  The Armed Forces must be 
able to recognize and take advantage of superior information converted to superior 
knowledge in order to achieve “decision superiority” to enhance decision-
making.[Reference 18] 
Decision superiority is defined as a force’s advantage to unambiguously define 
certain choices of actions and certain outcomes.[Reference 5]  Decision superiority 
results from superior information filtered through a commander’s experience, knowledge, 
training and judgment; the expertise of supporting staffs and other organizations; and the 
efficiency of associated processes.  While changes in the information environment have 
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led to a majority of the focus on the contribution of information superiority to command 
and control, it is equally necessary to understand the complete realm of command and 
control and how it affects decision-making. 
Command and control is most effective when decision superiority exists. 
Command and control is the exercise of authority and direction by force commanders 
over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission.[Reference 18]  
Command and control includes planning, directing, coordinating and controlling forces 
and operations and is focused on the effective execution of the operational plan; but, the 
central function is decision-making.   
In accordance with Joint Vision 2010, command and control will remain the 
primary integrating and coordinating function for operational capabilities and service 
components.  As the nature of military operations evolves, there is a need to continually 
evaluate the nature of command and control organizations, mechanisms, systems and 
tools.  The two major issues to address in this evaluation are command structures and 
processes, and the information systems and technologies that are best suited to support 
them.  Encompassed within these two issues, examination of the following concepts and 
desired capabilities will serve as a catalyst for changes in doctrine, organization and 
training. 
Information superiority is fundamental to the transformation of the operational 
capabilities of the joint force.  Our forces will use superior information and knowledge to 
achieve decision superiority, to support advanced command and control capabilities and 
to reach the full potential of our military capabilities.  
Joint Vision 2010, therefore, focuses and channels the entire Department’s 
innovation, energy and resources towards a single long-term goal.  The vision fully 
embraces the potential impact of information superiority and technological advances on 
military operations, resulting in a complete transformation of traditional warfighting 
concepts (e.g. maneuver, firepower, protection, sustainment) via changes in weapons 
systems, doctrine, culture and organization.  This transformation is highly reliant on the 
employment of information and if executed properly will result in the success of four new 
operational concepts that together aim at achieving full-spectrum dominance: dominant 
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maneuver, precision engagement, full-dimensional protection and focused 
logistics.[Reference 18] 
Dominant maneuver involves the multidimensional application of information, 
engagement and mobility which employs widely dispersed joint forces to apply decisive 
force upon an enemy’s centers of gravity to compel an adversary to either react from a 
position of disadvantage or resign from the conflict.  Dominant maneuver also involves 
the decisive application of force at critical points by leveraging U.S. asymmetric 
advantages to achieve operational objectives in minimum time and with minimum losses.  
The dominant maneuver concept requires several enhanced capabilities.  One such 
capability is the ability to provide and process the required data in real-time.  This will 
enable U.S. forces to be properly tailored for the specific operation, lighter and more 
rapidly deployable, and possess the requisite speed and force to mass effects and obtain 
positional advantages in time and space.  Flexible, responsive logistics are critical to this 
concept.  This tailor-to-task organizational ability, combined with focused logistics and 
advanced command and control, will reduce and disperse operational footprints and make 
it much more difficult for an adversary to fix and attack U.S. forces. 
Precision engagement provides the means by which joint forces achieve desired 
effects across the spectrum of military operations.  It promises the ability to find, fix, 
track and precisely target any military objective worldwide.  Precision engagement 
leverages information superiority and global situational awareness through near real-time 
information on the objectives or targets, and a joint awareness of the battlespace for 
dynamic command and control.  The result is a greater assurance of generating the 
desired effect against the objective or target, due to more precise delivery and increased 
survivability for all forces, weapons and platforms and the flexibility to rapidly assess the 
results of the engagement, then to reengage with precision when required.   
The precision engagement concept transcends the notion of firepower.  It 
encompasses achieving precise effects in cyberspace, as well as accurate and timely 
deliveries of humanitarian relief supplies or medical treatment to populations and 
directed psychological operations.  
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Protection for U.S. forces and facilities must be provided across the spectrum, 
from peacetime through crisis and at all levels of conflict.  Achieving this goal requires a 
joint command and control architecture that is built upon information superiority and 
employs a full array of active and passive measures at multiple echelons.  Full-
dimensional protection will enable U.S. forces to safely maintain freedom of action, 
which is the freedom from attack and the freedom to attack.  The development of a multi-
tiered theater missile defense, combined with offensive capabilities to neutralize enemy 
systems before and immediately after launch, are prime examples of full-dimensional 
protection efforts.  U.S. forces also need improved protection against chemical and 
biological weapons.  New chemical and biological weapons detectors, improved 
individual protective gear, and a greater emphasis on collective protection are all critical 
to the Department’s efforts to protect U.S. forces from these threats.  Finally, full-
dimensional protection includes defense against asymmetric attacks on information 
systems, infrastructure, and other critical areas vulnerable to nontraditional means of 
attack. 
Focused logistics integrates information superiority and technological innovations 
to develop state-of-the-art logistics practices and doctrine.  This will permit U.S. forces to 
accurately track and shift assets, thus facilitating the delivery of tailored logistics 
packages and more timely force sustainment.  Focused logistics will streamline the 
logistics footprint necessary to support and sustain more agile combat forces that can be 
rapidly projected around the globe.  Information intensive initiatives such as Automatic 
Identification Technology, Joint Total Asset Visibility, Global Transportation Network, 
and the Global Combat Support System will provide deployable, automated supply and 
maintenance information systems for precise and more responsive logistics.[Reference 
18]  These and other DoD-wide programs will be capable of supporting rapid unit 
deployment and employment.  They will better support joint force commanders by 
eliminating redundant requisitions and reducing delays in the shipment of essential 
supplies. 
It is clear that Joint Vision 2010 supports the idea that the operational 
effectiveness and mission capabilities of our Armed Forces are limited by the capacity of 
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its information infrastructure and the ability to enhance command, control and decision-
making. 
2. Joint Vision 2020 
Joint Vision 2020 extends the conceptual template established by Joint Vision 
2010 in order to further guide the continuing transformation of the Armed Forces.  In the 
year 2020, it is predicted that the nation will face even wider ranges of interests, 
opportunities and challenges and will require a military that can both win wars and 
contribute to peace.[Reference 19]  If the Armed Forces are to be prepared for these 
challenges by being faster, more lethal and more precise, it must continue to invest in and 
develop new military capabilities.  This vision describes the ongoing transformation to 
those new capabilities, and the extent to which the ability of our military to realize its full 
potential depends heavily upon our understanding of and performance in the information 
revolution.[Reference 19]   
Information, information processing and communications networks are at the core 
of every military activity.  The evolution of information technology will increasingly 
permit us to integrate the traditional forms of information operations with sophisticated 
all-source intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance in a fully synchronized 
information campaign.[Reference 19]  Joint Vision 2020 further emphasizes the 
commitment required to ensure that valuable information be provided on demand to 
warfighters, policy makers and support personnel in order to enhance combat power and 
contribute to the success of military operations. 
The overarching focus of this vision is full spectrum dominance, achieved through 
the interdependent application of dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focused 
logistics and full dimensional protection.  Attaining these goals requires the steady 
infusion of new technology and modernization.  However, material superiority alone is 
not sufficient.  Of greater importance is the development of doctrine, organizations, 
training and education, leaders and personnel that effectively take advantage of the 
technology. 
The evolution of these elements over the next two decades will be strongly 
influenced by two factors.  First, the continued development and proliferation of 
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information technologies will substantially change the conduct of military operations.   
These changes in the information environment make information superiority a key 
enabler of the transformation of the operational capabilities of the joint force and the 
evolution of joint command and control.  Second, the U.S. Armed Forces will continue to 
rely on a capacity for intellectual and technical innovation.  The pace of technological 
change, especially as it fuels changes in the strategic environment, will place a premium 
on our ability to foster innovation in our people and organizations across the entire range 
of joint operations.  The overall vision of the capabilities we will require in 2020 rests on 
our assessment of the strategic context in which our forces will operate. 
We will not necessarily sustain a wide technological advantage over our 
adversaries in all areas.  Increased availability of commercial satellites, digital 
communications and the public internet, all give adversaries new capabilities at a 
relatively low cost.  We should not expect opponents in 2020 to fight with strictly 
“industrial age” tools.  Our advantage must, therefore, come from leaders, personnel, 
doctrine, organizations and training that enable us to take advantage of technology to 
achieve superior warfighting effectiveness. 
Information operations are essential to achieving this full spectrum dominance.  
The joint force must be capable of conducting information operations, the purpose of 
which is to facilitate and protect U.S. decision-making processes, and in a conflict, 
degrade those of an adversary.  While activities and capabilities employed to conduct 
information operations are traditional functions of military forces, the pace of change in 
the information environment dictates that we expand this view and explore broader 
information operations strategies and concepts.  We must recognize that “nontraditional” 
adversaries who engage in “nontraditional” conflict are of particular importance in the 
information domain.  The United States, itself, and U.S. forces around the world are 
subject to information attacks on a continuous basis regardless of the level and degree of 
engagement in other domains of operation.  New offensive capabilities such as computer 
network attack techniques are evolving.  Activities such as information assurance, 
computer network defense and counter-deception will defend decision-making processes 
by neutralizing an adversary’s perception management and intelligence collection efforts, 
as well as direct attacks on our information systems.  Because the ultimate target of 
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information operations is the human decision-maker, the joint force commander will have 
difficulty accurately assessing the effects of those operations.  This problem of “battle 
damage assessment” for information operations is difficult and must be explored through 
exercises and rigorous experimentation. 
The continuing evolution of information operations and the global information 
environment holds two significant implications.  First, operations within the information 
domain will become as important as those conducted in the domains of sea, land, air and 
space.  Such operations will be inextricably linked to focused logistics, full dimensional 
protection, precision engagement and dominant maneuver, as well as joint command and 
control.  At the same time, information operations may evolve into a separate mission 
area requiring appropriately designed organizations and trained specialists.   
There also exists a significant potential for asymmetric engagements in the 
information domain.  The United States has enjoyed a distinct technological advantage in 
the information environment and will likely continue to do so.  However, as potential 
adversaries reap the benefits of the information revolution, the comparative advantage for 
the U.S. and its partners may become more difficult to maintain.  As a result, our ever-
increasing dependence on information processes, systems and technologies adds potential 
vulnerabilities that must be defended. 
Joint Vision 2020 has a profound impact on the development of U.S. military 
capabilities.  By describing those capabilities necessary to achieve success in 2020, three 
important concepts are established.  First, JV 2020 established a common framework and 
language for the military forces to develop and explain their unique contributions to the 
joint force.  Second, a process was created for conducting joint experimentation and 
training to test ideas against practice.  Finally, a process began in order to manage the 
transformation of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, 
personnel and facilities necessary to make the vision a reality.  Joint Vision 2020 builds 
on the foundation of Joint Vision 2010 and confirms the direction of the ongoing 
transformation of operational capabilities, and emphasizes the importance of further 
experimentation, exercises, analysis and conceptual thought, especially in the arenas of 
information operations. 
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3. Previous Research Conducted by Bracken and Darilek 
This thesis is a continuation of work previously performed for the U.S. Army by 
Dr. Jerome Bracken and Dr. Richard Darilek of RAND’s Arroyo Center on the value of 
information.  Bracken and Darilek contend that there are three overarching concepts that 
frame predictions about the future in which U.S. military forces are expected to operate.  
The first concept is that “an Information Age is beginning to unfold and that it 
will largely define the first half of the twenty-first century.”[Reference 1]  It is believed 
that the Information Age will have the same relative impact as that of the Industrial 
Revolution during the latter half of the nineteenth century. 
The dawning of the Information Age has given rise to advances in information 
technologies and information processing capabilities.  The United States has led and 
maintains a significant advantage in the development of information-based technologies.  
This advantage is well grounded in U.S. military capabilities.  The roots of the U.S. 
military’s information-based technologies have been decades in the making, including the 
development and application of computer networks, precision-guided munitions, the 
Global Positioning System, and air and space based sensors.  Yet, this rapid evolution in 
capabilities has not yet fundamentally transformed all of the essential elements of U.S. 
forces necessary to fully realize its maximum potential and effectiveness. 
As information-based technologies and capabilities continue to mature, they 
become much less expensive, and can be rapidly incorporated by other military forces to 
enhance their capabilities.  Just as in the past, the underlying information-based 
technologies upon which our future military will be based are becoming readily available 
to the military forces of many other nations.  This underscores the imperative for the 
Department of Defense to develop a robust transformation strategy and mechanism to 
bring about the changes needed in the military’s essential elements of strategy, doctrine, 
training, organization, equipment, operations, tactics and leadership in order to meet the 
challenges of the 21st century and the goals stated in Joint Vision 2010 and 2020. 
Joint Vision 2010 identified technological innovation as a vital component of the 
transformation of our forces.  Throughout the industrial age, the United States has relied 
upon its capacity for technological innovation to succeed in military operations, and the 
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need to do so will continue.  It is important, however, to broaden our focus beyond 
technology and capture the importance of organizational and conceptual innovation as 
well.  Innovation, in its simplest form, is the combination of new “things” with new 
“ways” to carry out tasks.  In reality, it may result from fielding completely new things, 
or the imaginative recombination of old things in new ways.  An effective innovation 
process requires continuous learning, a means of interaction and exchange that evaluates 
goals, operational lessons, exercises, experiments and simulations, accompanied by the 
inclusion of feedback mechanisms.   
There exists, however, a high degree of uncertainty inherent in the pursuit of 
innovation.  The key to coping with that uncertainty is bold leadership supported by as 
much information as possible.  Leaders must assess the effectiveness of new ideas, the 
potential drawbacks to new concepts, the costs versus benefits of new technologies and 
the organizational implications of new capabilities.  They must make these assessments 
in the context of an evolving analysis of the economic, political and technological factors 
of the anticipated security environment.  Even though each of these assessments will have 
uncertainty associated with them, the best innovations have often come from people who 
made decisions and achieved success despite uncertainties and the lack of assurance of a 
positive outcome. 
By creating and supporting innovation, the Armed Forces also create their best 
opportunities for coping with the increasing pace of change in the overall environment in 
which they function.  Ultimately, the goal is to develop reasonable approaches with 
enough flexibility to recover from errors and unforeseen circumstances.  There is no 
exact formula as to how the U.S. military should take advantage of the information 
revolution and the possibility of realizing its full potential.  Rather, it requires extensive 
experimentation both to understand the potential contributions of emerging technologies 
and to develop innovative operational concepts to harness these new technologies. 
The Information Age is predicted to transform the nature of future military 
operations to the extent of resulting in a Revolution in Military Affairs 
(RMA).[Reference 1]  Bracken and Darilek’s second concept is “that for an RMA to 
occur, the role of information, its technologies and their organization is 
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critical.”[Reference 1]  A Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) occurs when a nation’s 
military seizes an opportunity to transform its strategy, military doctrine, training, 
education, organization, equipment, operations and tactics to achieve decisive military 
results in fundamentally new ways.  History offers several such illustrations for example: 
the revolutionary French Republic’s levee en masse; the development of the blitzkrieg by 
the German Air Force and Army; and extensive, sustained, open ocean maritime 
operations developed by the U.S. Navy.[Reference 19]  In all of these examples, the 
underlying technologies which made these revolutions possible were readily available to 
both opposing forces, however, in each case only one of the opposing forces made the 
commitment to transform the essential elements of its armed forces in such a manner as 
to achieve a dominant and decisive advantage in warfare.  While exploiting the 
Revolution in Military Affairs is only one aspect of the Department of Defense’s 
transformation strategy, it is a crucial one.  The refinement and expansion of the current 
RMA will provide the Department with a unique opportunity to transform the way in 
which it conducts the full range of military operations.  Through the development of 
Information Age technologies, the RMA is expected to produce information superiority 
which future U.S. forces are expected to benefit from over their opponents. 
The third concept, information superiority, is defined as “the capability to collect, 
process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or 
denying an adversary’s ability to do the same.”[Reference 1]  This third concept serves as 
the focus of this thesis.  Bracken and Darilek explored the concepts of how much 
information superiority would be necessary for U.S. military forces to be able to obtain a 
quantifiable advantage over their opponents in the coming Information Age.  This thesis 
extends their work by looking at: (1) asymmetric force, (2) varying levels of information 
superiority and intelligence and (3) different payoff distributions. 
B. STATEMENT OF THESIS 
Before doing battle, in the temple one calculates and will win, because 
many calculations were made; before doing battle, in the temple one 
calculates and will not win, because few calculations were made; many 
calculations, victory, few calculations, no victory, then how much less 
sowhen no calculations? - Sun-Tzu: The Principles of Warfare “The Art of 
War” 
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Throughout history, the collection, exploitation and protection of information has 
been critical in command, control and intelligence.  As discussed in Joint Vision 2010, 
the importance of information to the Armed Forces will continue to increase well into the 
future.  What will differ, however, is the increased access to information and 
improvements in the speed and accuracy of prioritizing and transferring data brought 
about by advances in techno logy.[Reference 18]  These technological advances generate 
numerous challenges for the U.S. military in achieving and maintaining information 
superiority over all potential enemies.  In order to ensure our strategic upper hand, the 
understanding of the value of information and its applications to modern warfare are 
paramount.  Joint Vision 2010 supports that information superiority will require a 
complete understanding of the value of information in order to successfully conduct both 
offensive and defensive  information warfare.[Reference 18]  Offensive information 
warfare will be conducted through the degradation or exploitation of the adversary’s 
collection and use of information, and defensive information warfare will be conducted to 
protect our ability to perform information operations.[Reference 18] 
Joint Vision 2020 places an even greater emphasis on the value of information 
and information superiority.  Due to the fact that advances in information capabilities are 
proceeding so rapidly, there exists the risk of outstripping our ability to capture ideas, 
formulate operational concepts and develop the capacity to efficiently assess 
results.[Reference 19]  The Armed Forces of the future will be required to take advantage 
of superior information by converting data into superior knowledge at an increasingly 
faster rate, in order to achieve the capability to formulate superior decisions.  The ability 
to execute improved decision-making faster than an opponent can respond will increase a 
force’s ability to shape, control and react to situations and changes in order to more 
efficiently accomplish objectives.  Joint Vision 2020 states that the realization of the full 
potential of these changes requires not only technological improvements, but equally 
important, the continuing evolution of organizations and doctrine, and the development 
of relevant training to sustain a comparative advantage in the information 
environment.[Reference 19] 
The research questions of this thesis address the military’s ability to use 
information as a force multiplier.  Consider a Blue force commander’s level of 
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information of an impending Red force attack (e.g., type of attack, type of weapons used, 
size of force, etc.), and a Red force commander’s level of information of the Blue force 
(e.g., location of camps, size of force, type of defenses, quality of communication 
systems, etc.).  The first research question addresses the value of the gain and loss of 
correct information that opposing forces possess and how it may affect potential 
outcomes of battle. 
The second research question examines the effects of the value of information to 
opposing forces if the quantity of decisions that are available to these forces are varied.  
For example, if the Blue force possesses more options, will this provide an advantage; or 
if the Red force has fewer choices to make, will this simplify their decision-making and 
allow their commander’s to make better decisions?   
The third research question considers the value of the effects of intelligence on 
the decision-making of opposing forces in battle.  Consider the situation in which both 
the Blue and Red forces possess common knowledge of the values associated with their 
respective strategies, however, the Blue force knows what choices of strategy the Red 
force will decide before execution.  It is examined how decision-making and deployment 
of forces is affected by the use of intelligence and information warfare. 
The fourth research question addresses the effects of the value of information by 
varying the capabilities of opposing forces.  The probabilities of victory and payoffs for 
each force is computed by calculating the averages of trials of games composed of 
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II. GAME THEORY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Game Theory, the methodology used in this thesis, is the study of the interactive 
behavior of decision-making.  Game theorists are interested in situations in which a 
decision-maker's behavior affects not only their own gains and losses, but also those of 
opposing decision-makers.  In order to analyze such interactive situations, game theorists 
use game theoretical concepts and mathematical tools to create simplified descriptions of 
real- life situations or "models". 
The term "game" stems from the formal resemblance of these interactive decision 
problems to common parlor games such as Chess, Bridge, Poker, Monopoly, Diplomacy, 
Battleship, military strategy games such as the defense of targets against attack and 
economic games such as the price competition between two sellers.[Reference 5]   
A game consists of a set of rules governing a competitive situation in which from 
two to the variable (n) individuals or groups of individuals choose strategies designed to 
maximize their winnings.  The rules specify the possible actions for each player, the 
amount of information received by each as play progresses and the amounts won or lost 
in various situations.     
For the social sciences, Game Theory is a powerful tool to analyze rational 
behavior, although Game Theory in general is not restricted to the analysis of rational 
actors.  What makes Game Theory so attractive to social scientists is its ability to produce 
very general explanations of human and institutional behavior, which then can be applied 
to particular cases of human interaction.   
In today's diversified and interdependent societies, scientific decision-making 
constitutes an essential part of military, political and economic processes.  The 
consequences of seemingly simple decis ions affect more and more people, and wrong 
decisions can lead to catastrophic outcomes, such as unemployment, environmental 
pollution, bankruptcies, international crises, social unrest and lost wars.  Game Theory 
helps to understand why decision-makers make good or bad choices under different 
conditions, and how choices and choice processes can be improved. 
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B. HISTORY 
The mathematical theory of games was first developed by John Von Neumann 
and Oskar Morgenstern in their 1944 book Theory of Games and Economic 
Behavior.[Reference 11]  Limitations in their mathematical framework initially made the 
theory applicable only under special and limited conditions.  This situation has gradually 
changed over the past six decades, as the framework has been deepened and generalized.  
Refinements are still being made.  However, since at least the late 1970s, it has been 
possible to say with confidence that Game Theory is an important and useful tool in an 
analyst’s kit whenever confronted with problems in which one agent’s rational decision-
making depends on the expectations about what one or more other agents will do.  Von 
Neumann and Morgenstern restricted their attention to zero-sum games in which no 
player can gain except at another's expense.   
During the early 1950s, the work of John F. Nash further refined the 
developments of Von Neumann and Morgenstern.[Reference 11]  Nash mathematically 
clarified the distinction between cooperative and non-cooperative games.  In non-
cooperative games, no outside authority assures that players stick to the same 
predetermined rules, and binding agreements are not feasible.  Furthermore, he 
recognized that in non-cooperative games there exist sets of optimal strategies, called 
“Nash equilibria”, used by players in a game such that no player can benefit by 
unilaterally changing his or her strategy if the strategies of the other players remain 
unchanged.[Reference 6]  Because non-cooperative games are common in the real world, 
the discovery revolutionized game theory.  Nash also recognized that such an equilibrium 
solution would also be optimal in cooperative games.  He suggested approaching the 
study of cooperative games via their reduction to non-cooperative form and proposed a 
methodology, called “the Nash program”, for doing so.[Reference 6]  Nash also 
introduced the concept of “bargaining”, in which two or more players collude to produce 
a situation where failure to collude would make each of them worse off.[Reference 11] 
A major distinction between multi-person decision problems, Game Theory, and 
one-person decision problems is that in the one-person context, we are usually led to a 
well-defined optimization problem, like maximizing an objective function subject to 
some constraints.  While this problem may be difficult to solve in practice, it involves no 
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conceptual issues.  The meaning of "optimal decision" is clear; we must only find one.  
But in the interactive multi-person context, the very meaning of "optimal decision" is 
unclear, since in general, no one player completely controls the final outcome.  This 
concept directly correlates to most military situations that involve a thinking adversary.  
In such cases, the payoff one player receives depends both on their actions and those of 
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III. GAMING MODEL 
A. DESCRIPTION OF ZERO-SUM, TWO-SIDED GAMES 
Following Bracken and Darilek, this thesis uses Game Theory as a methodology 
to study the value of various forms of information in military operations.  Specifically, 
zero-sum two-sided games are studied.   
Each game is structured around potential military operations as depicted below: 
 
Figure 3.1. Example Structure of Game Matrix. 
 
The Blue and Red forces have strategy choices i = 1,2,---, m and j = 1,2,---, n 
respectively.  For each pair of choices there exists a payoff ai,j generated using random 
numbers.  The Blue force receives ai,j and the Red force loses ai,j.  The Blue force 
therefore wishes to maximize the payoff, and the Red force wishes to minimize the 
payoff.  This leads the Blue force to pursue what is referred to as a “maximin” strategy 
(to maximize their minimum possible payoff) and leads the Red force to pursue a 
“minimax” strategy (to minimize the maximum possible payoff). 
Again, following Bracken and Darilek, the game theoretic strategies are computed 
by the game matrices given various conditions.  The Blue force’s best strategy is 
determined by computing, for each possible choice (i), the worst (minimum) outcome 
i,min i,j
j
a  = min(a )  that comes about if the Red force makes the best choice consistent with 
the Blue force’s choice of (i).  The best choice for the Blue force is therefore the row 
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choice (i) that maximizes i,min i,j
ji
a  =  max(min(a ))   The Blue force chooses the row for 
which ai,min is the largest.  The payoff for the Blue force is therefore at least as good as 
max,min i,j
ji
a  = max(min(a )).   
The Red force strategy is computed using the reverse process as that of the Blue 
force.  For each of the possible choices (j) for the Red force, their least favorable strategy  
is the maximum outcome max,j i,jia = max(a )  that comes about if the Blue force makes 
best choice consistent with the Red force’s choice of (j).  The best choice for the Red 
force is therefore the column choice (j) that minimizes max,j i,j
j i
a  = min(max(a )).   The 
Red force chooses the column for which max,j a  is the smallest.  The payoff for the Red 
force is, therefore, at least as good as (i.e., no higher than) min,max i,j
j i
a  = min(max(a )) .  It 
is also important to note that like Bracken and Darilek, the game outcome values are 
determined using pure strategies (i.e., there is no random selection of rows and columns). 
The conflict between the Blue force and the Red force is viewed abstractly as 
follows.  In any given battle, the Blue force’s choice of strategies has some effect on the 
outcome, as well as the choices of the Red force.  Depending on the circumstances of the 
battle, however, these strategies make more or less of a difference.  The value of 
information on the outcome of the conflicts is examined by considering vast arrays of 
battles in which strategies may have very different consequences on the outcome.  The 
assessment is then made as to how much value information has on average over the array 
of battles.  For each of the 1,000 different trials (battles), a payoff matrix is generated 
using random numbers with a specified distribution.  The knowledge that each force has 
about the payoff matrix is varied, and the forces select strategies based on their leve l of 
knowledge.   
For each game, the type of information available to the two sides, as well as the 
amount of information available is varied.  Each game includes both sides having 3, 5, or 
10 choices or strategies available for achieving victory.  This is simulated using 3´3, 3´5, 
3´10, 5´3, 5´5, 5´10, 10´3, 10´5 and 10´10 matrices in order to calculate the 
probabilities of victory or payoffs for Side 1 (the Blue force) versus Side 2 (the Red 
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force).  The payoffs represent the calculated averages of 1,000 trials of the matrices 
games composed of random numbers.  This ensures that the estimated average payoffs 
are close to the true values.  Unless otherwise specified, the payoffs are drawn from a 
discrete uniform [0,100] random variable.  For a uniform [0,100] random variable, the 
standard deviation is sqrt(1002/12) = 28.87.  The mean of 1,000 such random variables 
has a standard error of 28.87/(sqrt(1000)) = 0.91.  The standard error of the mean of 
1,000 game values will be less than this, 0.91, boundary value.   
The simulated game battles are coded in Excel and Crystal Ball.  Example 
symmetric and asymmetric matrices are shown below: 
 
Figure 3.2. Example 3´3 Game Matrix. 
 
The 3´3 symmetric matrix in figure 3.2 shows the Blue force choosing maximin 
row strategy 1 with a value of 29, and the Red force choosing minimax column strategy 
3, for a value of 74.  The payoff of the game battle is shown at the intersection of row 1 
and column 3, for a value of 74.  Similarly, figure 3.3 displays a 3´5 asymmetric matrix 
with the Blue force choosing maximin row strategy 3 for a value of 17, and the Red force 
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choosing minimax column strategy 1 for a value of 25.  The payoff for this game battle, 
at the intersection of row strategy 3 and column strategy 1, is 17. 
 
 
Figure 3.3. Example 3´5 Game Matrix. 
 
B. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS BY BRACKEN AND DARILEK  
Table 3.1 shows a summary table of the findings by Bracken and Darilek for three 
sets of matrices for four games.[Reference 1]  Bracken and Darilek use Game Theory as a 
means to quantify the value of information superiority. 
Table 3.1. Data for Bracken and Darilek Experiments. 
 
Number of  
 Strategies         Game 1        Game 2        Game 3        Game 4 
  Per Side 
 
     3´3                  50.0             62.5             57.5              75.2 
     5´5            50.2       60.8             65.4           83.0 
   10´10           48.9       58.9             75.4              91.2 
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Bracken and Darilek observe three sizes of game matrices at four levels of 
information for the Blue force (Side 1).  In the four games, the Blue force’s information 
advantage increases as the games proceed from Game 1 to Game 4. 
For the first game, where Side 1 and Side 2 both have common knowledge of all 
values of the payoff matrix, Side 1 chooses the ir maximin strategy and Side 2 chooses 
their minimax strategy.  Since the underlying payoffs are random and distributed 
uniformly between 0 and 100, the expected payoff is 50.  The numbers in Table 3.1 are 
the means of 1,000 replications.  They conclude that since the expected payoff in Game 1 
is always approximately 50 for all three symmetric (3´3, 5´ 5 and 10´10) matrices, the 
simulation is valid. 
Secondly, Bracken and Darilek observe that the 10´10 matrix (i.e., many options 
are available to both sides) provides the maximum increase in expected payoff from 
Game 1 to Game 4.  For example, for Game 2 where Side 1 has correct information and 
Side 2 has incorrect information, the expected payoff yields a marginal gain of 8.9 over 
the expected payoff of 50.0.  Game 3, with Side 1 knowing Side 2’s move, yields a 
marginal gain of 25.4 over the expected payoff of 50.0.  Game 4, with both bad 
information for Side 2 and Side 1 knowing Side 2’s move, yields a marginal gain of 41.2 
over the expected payoff of 50.0. 
For the 3´3 matrix, the results are quite different than for the 10´10 case. Bracken 
and Darilek note that Game 2, where Side 2 has bad information, yields a marginal gain 
of 12.5 over the expected payoff of 50.0, compared with 8.9 in the 10´10 case.  Game 3, 
where Side 1 knows Side 2’s move, yields a marginal gain of 7.5, compared with 25.4 in 
the 10´10 case.  This suggests that intelligence is more important when there are more 
choices an adversary can make.  Game 4, where Side 2 has bad information and Side 1 
knows Side 2’s move, yields a marginal gain of 25.2, compared with 41.2 in the 10´10 
case. 
It is determined, therefore, that the overall effects of information are not usually 
as great in the 3´3 case (with fewer options) as in the 10´10 case (with many options), 
with some exceptions.  For example, bad information for Side 2 has more relative effect 
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in the 3´ 3 case.  Side 1 knowing Side 2’s choice has more relative effect in the 10´10 
case.  Combining the effects of Side 2 having bad information and Side 1 knowing Side 
2’s choice has a relatively more pronounced outcome in the 3´3 case, than in the 10´10 
case.   
The research conducted by Bracken and Darilek assumes that each force either 
possesses correct information or incorrect information and that the knowledge of the 
decisions of an opponent is either known or unknown.  This thesis extends their research 
by considering the value of information superiority and its affects on the outcomes of 
decision-making, as the information varies between totally correct and incorrect, 
evaluated for asymmetric, as well as symmetric forces, and using different payoff 
distributions. 
C. SPECIFICATION OF GAMES 
This section details the six experiments designed to represent, by analogy, 
different assumptions about the information available to two opposing forces, the joint 
U.S. Armed Forces (Blue force) versus an opponent (Red force).  Additionally, varying 
levels of dimensionality are considered with respect to the number of courses of action 
available to both sides.  The effects of information differ depending on these 
characteristics, which have an intuitive relationship with warfare. 
1. Replication of Bracken and Darilek Experiment of Common and 
Correct Knowledge With Varying Strategy Choices  
The first game simulation is a replication of the experiment performed by Bracken 
and Darilek simulating opposing forces with common and correct knowledge.  This thesis 
extends their experiment by varying the number of strategies available for each force.  
Whereas Bracken and Darilek use only 3´ 3, 5´ 5 and 10´10 symmetric matrices, this 
thesis varies the number of strategies and simulates additional combinations including 
3´5, 3´10, 5´3, 5´10, 10´3 and 10´5 matrices.  A more capable force will likely have 
more options. 
2. Value of Various Levels of Correct and Incorrect Information  
In this experiment, both forces initially know and agree on the random numbers 
that appear in all rows and columns of the 3´3, 3´5, 3´10, 5´3, 5´5, 5´10, 10´3, 10´5 
and 10´10 payoff matrices created by their opposing strategies.  Therefore, both sides 
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have the same type of information, and neither benefits qualitatively from information 
superiority.  However, the quantity of this information for the Red forces is decremented 
from 100% to 0%.  It is assumed that the Red force possesses information degradation 
(i.e., the Blue force gains the advantage of information superiority via offensive 
information warfare or a lack of information systems by the Red force).  The information 
degradation by the Red force is simulated by replacing correct information with incorrect 
information, one column at a time, from payoffs using a separate matrix with a different 
set of random numbers using the same distribution as that of the correct matrix.  These 
results are compared to those of Bracken and Darilek, who found that when neither side 
enjoys information superiority, the contribution of knowledge to winning has the same 
value for both forces.[Reference 1]  They also found that this seems to hold regardless of 
the number of strategies available to each side in their symmetric games.[Reference 1]  It 
is determined, however, that if one side possesses bad information, there exists a 
marginal gain for the force with correct information, and this gain is more prominent for 
the smaller 3´3 matrix, as opposed to a smaller gain for the larger matrix of 10´10. 
3. Replication of Bracken and Darilek Experiment of Common and 
Correct Knowledge and Intelligence With Varying Strategy Choices  
For this experiment, both forces initially have correct knowledge of the values 
associated with their strategies in the 3´ 3, 3´ 5, 3´ 10, 5´ 3, 5´ 5, 5´ 10, 10´3, 10´5 and 
10´10 matrices.  As a result, the best strategy for the Red force is to make a decision 
using minimax.  In this game, however, the Blue force knows the Red force’s strategy 
with certain probability and has knowledge of the decisions that the Red force makes.  
The Blue force is therefore using reconnaissance and or intelligence to obtain information 
about the Red force’s strategic intentions.  This allows the Blue force to focus only on the 
payoffs corresponding to the minimax choice of the Red force vice using the maximin 
strategy.  The Blue force, therefore, is able to maximize their payoff given the Red 
force’s course of action.  These results are compared to those of Bracken and Darilek, 
who found that with similar levels of information, one side knowing the moves of the 
opponent, yields a greater marginal gain in payoff for the force with the intelligence and 
that this gain is more prominent for the larger matrix of 10´10, as compared to the 
smaller matrices of 3´3 and 5´5. 
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4. Value of Various Levels of Information With Intelligence 
In this experiment both forces initially have correct information, thereby knowing 
the values associated with the strategies of their opponent.  Additionally, the Blue force 
knows the Red force’s choice of strategy.  In this case, the Blue force possesses both 
correct information and intelligence.  The Red force’s level of correct information is 
varied by degrading it from 100% to 0% for each matrix.  The Red force is therefore 
assumed to possess information degradation as a result of offensive information warfare 
and deception tactics employed by the Blue force.  These results are compared to those of 
Bracken and Darilek, who found that with one force having bad information and the 
opposing force having both correct information and prior knowledge of the choices to be 
made by their opponent, these criteria yield the highest marginal gain of payoff among all 
scenarios.  It is also noted that this increase of payoff becomes more prominent as the 
number of choices increases. 
5. Value of Varying Capabilities of Forces 
This experiment addresses the affects of various levels of information on 
opposing forces as the capabilities of the forces are altered.  This scenario varies the 
capabilities of opposing forces by using different boundaries for the random number 
distributions.  For each payoff value in the matrices, the Blue force first has increasingly 
superior force capabilities.  Superior forces are simulated by altering the uniform 
distribution of the Blue force row choices from 50 to 100.  Similarly, the Blue force 
simulates increasingly inferior force capabilities by altering the boundaries of the uniform 
distribution of the row choices from 0 to 50.  The varying levels of superior and inferior 
capabilities for the Blue force are conducted by increasing the number of different rows 
for the Blue force from 0% to 100% for both superior and inferior forces. 
6. Value of Varying Levels of Information Using Normal Distribution 
Payoffs 
A variation of the methodology used in this thesis is to generate payoffs in each 
matrix using different distributions.  This differs from the experiments conducted by 
Bracken and Darilek who generate payoffs for matrices using random numbers uniformly 
distributed between 0 to100.  In this experiment, the matrices are developed with random 
numbers using the truncated normal distribution with a mean of 50, a standard deviation 
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of sqrt(1002/12) = 28.87, a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 100.  These normal random 
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IV. DATA AND ANALYSIS 
This section displays the statistical results (mean, median, standard deviation, 
minimum, maximum and mean standard error) for each of the six experiments in a table 
format followed by a graph and an analysis of the estimated average payoffs for each 
corresponding matrix scenario.  Higher average payoffs reflect better outcomes for the 
Blue force.  When the two forces are equivalent, the average will be close to 50 (allowing 
for some random variation).  
A. REPLICATION OF BRACKEN AND DARILEK EXPERIMENT OF 
COMMON AND CORRECT KNOWLEDGE WITH VARYING 
STRATEGY CHOICES 
1. Introduction 
In this test, the first experiment performed by Braken and Darilek is replicated by 
simulating opposing forces with common and correct knowledge.  Their experiment is 
extended by varying the amount of strategies available for each force.  Whereas the 
experiment conducted by Bracken and Darilek only uses symmetric 3´3, 5´5 and 10´10 
matrices, this experiment varies the number of strategies and simulates all combinations 
including asymmetric 3´5, 3´10, 5´3, 5´10, 10´3 and 10´5 matrices.  The intent of this 
experiment is to observe the effects of different numbers of strategies on opposing forces 











2. Analysis of Data and Graph 
 
Table 4.1. Data for Both Forces With Correct Information. 
 
Statistics 3x3 3x5 3x10 5x3 5x5 5x10 10x3 10x5 10x10 
Mean 48.93 41.11 30.28 58.32 49.02 40.21 68.65 59.72 50.16
Median 48.00 40.00 29.00 58.00 49.00 39.00 69.00 60.00 50.00
Standard Deviation 19.81 18.10 16.34 17.47 18.27 18.19 15.09 17.73 19.18
Minimum 4.00 2.00 0.00 10.00 6.00 3.00 24.00 17.00 0.00
Maximum 93.00 89.00 98.00 96.00 94.00 98.00 97.00 98.00 96.00
Mean Std. Error 0.63 0.57 0.52 0.55 0.58 0.58 0.48 0.56 0.61
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Figure 4.1. Graph of Data for Both Forces With Correct Information. 
 
The statistics in Table 4.1 display the mean, median, standard deviation, 
minimum, maximum and mean standard error of the outcome values for each of the 3´3, 
3´5, 3´ 10, 5´ 3, 5´ 5, 5´ 10, 10´3, 10´5 and 10´10 payoff matrices that simulate battle 
between the Blue and Red forces.  Figure 4.1 graphs the mean outcome values in Table 
4.1, versus the corresponding payoff matrices.  For example, the graph depicts a negative 
slope for the 3´3 to 3´10 payoff matrices, as the mean outcome value decreases in favor 
of the Red force from 48.93 to 30.28.  Similarly, the graph further shows the mean 
outcome value decrease from 58.32 to 40.21 for the 5´ 3 to 5´ 10 payoff matrices and 
from 68.65 to 50.16 for the 10´3 to 10´10 payoff matrices. 
As the Blue force’s number of strategic options increase from 3 to 5 and 10, while 
the Red force’s number of choices remain constant at 3, the payoff value increases in 
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favor of the Blue force by a value of 19.72.  Similarly, when the Red force’s number of 
choices of strategy are held constant at 5 and the Blue force’s options vary from 3 to 5 
and 10, the margin of victory for the Blue force increases by a slightly lower value of 
18.61.  And finally, when the Red force’s number of strategies are held constant at 10, 
while the Blue force’s choices vary from 3 to 5 and 10, the Blue force’s advantage 
increases by an outcome value of 19.88.  This suggests that flexible forces (i.e., those 
with several options) have a significant advantage even when they have no information or 
payoff advantage.  The results of this experiment draw comparisons to the fundamentals 
of the Joint Vision dominant maneuver concept in that U.S. forces are trained to seize the 
advantage in conflict by employing widely dispersed, properly tailored, lighter and 
rapidly deployable joint forces that strike at an enemy’s critical points and centers of 
gravity. 
B. VALUE OF VARIOUS LEVELS OF CORRECT AND INCORRECT 
INFORMATION 
1. Introduction 
For this game, both forces initially have correct information, meaning that both 
sides know the values of the payoffs in each matrix before making a decision.  The 
quality of the information for the Red force is then altered by replacing perfect 
information in the options of the Red force with incorrect information (bad columns) 
from a separate matrix generated independently with the same distribution.  For example, 
for the 3´ 3 matrix, the first column is replaced with incorrect information (one bad 
column) and the battle is simulated.  Next, the matrix is simulated with two bad columns, 
and finally with all three columns of incorrect information.  In the latter case, the Red 
force possesses 100% bad information, and the Blue force assumes information 
superiority.   
This experiment addresses the value of one force gaining information superiority 
over its opposition.  Each column in the data tables represents the payoffs of the matrices, 
as the number of bad columns of incorrect information for the Red force is increased 




2. Analysis of Data and Graphs  
 
Table 4.2. Data for 3´3 Matrix With Red Force Degrading Information. 
 
3x3 Statistics 0 Bad 1 Bad 2 Bad 3 Bad 
Mean 48.68 54.56 56.85 59.99
Median 48.00 55.00 56.00 61.00
Standard Deviation 20.03 21.72 23.30 23.71
Minimum 3.00 5.00 3.00 3.00
Maximum 98.00 99.00 99.00 99.00
Mean Std. Error 0.63 0.69 0.74 0.75
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Estimated Average Payoffs Linear Regression Line (b1=3.62)
 
Figure 4.2. Graph of Data for 3´3 Matrix With Red Force Degrading Information. 
 
For the symmetric 3´3 payoff matrix, as the quantity of incorrect column 
strategies for the Red force increases from 0 to 3, the battle outcome value increases in 
favor of the Blue force for a total marginal gain of 11.31.  The largest increase in payoff 
for the Blue force occurs when the Red force chooses among 1 of 3 incorrect courses of 
action. 
In Figure 4.2, the estimated average payoffs line suggests that a strong locally 
linear relationship exists between the independent variable (columns of Red force bad 
information) and the dependent variable (payoffs).  Since the standard deviations are all 
about the same, ordinary least squares is used to determine the local underlying trend 
between the payoff values and the loss of information for the Red force.  As a result, the 
linear regression equation (average payoff = 49.582 + 3.622 * Red force bad columns) 
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fits the data very well and describes the relationship between payoffs and Red force bad 
information.  From the regression model, we see that for every bad Red force column, the 
estimated average payoff increases in favor of the Blue force by a value of 3.622.  In 
Figure 4.2, the estimated slope (b1) is shown by (b1 = 3.62).  This notation is used on the 
upcoming figures in which a linear regression fits the data.  These results suggest that 
when a force has a significant disadvantage, there is continual and substantial added 
value to information superiority. 
As will be seen in the forthcoming figures, in all of our models, the regressions fit 
very well, typically with an R2 of greater than 0.90.  When a linear fit is sufficient, the 
slope (b1) is shown.  When a non- linear fit is required (e.g., the data align more along a 
quadratic or cubic curve), this non- linearity is noted.  All of the regressions fit in this 
thesis are performed by regressing the average payoff against the levels of bad 
information.  For example, the regression line in Figure 4.2 is generated using the four 
points in the figure and not the 4,000 observations that went into calculating the means 
(this is known as ecological regression).  Either approach yields the same regression 
equation,which is our goal.  It should be noted, however, that a consequence of regressing 
on the average payoffs, rather than the raw numbers, is that the R2 values in the 
regression averages are much higher than they otherwise would be.  In all of the 
regression models, we determine whether a linear fit is sufficient, and if so, what the 
estimated slope (b1) is, or whether there exists a nonlinear (e.g., quadratic or cubic) 
relationship.  The reader is cautioned that the regressions apply only to the regions used 
to develop the equations and cannot be extrapolated beyond the data considered or to 
other models.  In fact, doing so may yield nonsensical results.  For example, extrapolating 
the fits can result in expected average payoffs of greater than 100, which is not feasible. 
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Table 4.3. Data for 3´5 Matrix With Red Force Degrading Information. 
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Estimated Average Payoffs Linear Regression Line (b1=3.45)
 
Figure 4.3. Graph of Data for 3´5 Matrix With Red Force Degrading Information. 
 
In the 3´5 case, the Red force, being a more capable force with more options, has 
the advantage when both forces possess correct information, however, as the quantity of 
incorrect information for the Red force increases from 0 column strategies to 5, the 
payoff increases in favor of the Blue force (from 41.28 for 0 bad strategies to 57.76 for 
all 5 bad strategies) for a gain of 16.48.  The Blue force, in this case, needs to degrade at 
least 3 of the Red force’s strategies to overcome the disadvantage (i.e., average payoff 
greater than 50).  These results show the benefit of information superiority for the Blue 
force in overcoming its force disadvantage to the Red force.    
3x5 Statistics 0 Bad 1 Bad 2 Bad 3 Bad 4 Bad 5 Bad 
Mean 41.28 43.43 47.03 51.82 54.59 57.76
Median 41.00 42.00 45.00 49.00 53.00 58.00
Standard Deviation 18.42 20.56 23.01 25.07 25.19 25.07
Minimum 2.00 3.00 2.00 1.00 5.00 2.00
Maximum 91.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00
Mean Std. Error 0.58 0.65 0.73 0.79 0.80 0.79
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Table 4.4. Data for 3´10 Matrix With Red Force Degrading Information. 
 
3x10 Statistics 0 Bad 1 Bad 2 Bad 3 Bad 4 Bad 5 Bad 6 Bad 7 Bad 8 Bad 9 Bad 10 Bad 
Mean 30.48 32.87 34.94 37.57 39.71 41.90 43.92 47.92 49.65 51.78 52.84
Median 29.00 31.00 32.00 33.00 36.00 37.00 40.00 45.00 48.00 49.00 53.00
Standard Deviation 15.18 18.35 20.13 22.71 24.54 24.74 26.09 26.36 26.66 27.02 26.84
Minimum 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 0.00 2.00 1.00 1.00
Maximum 77.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00
Mean Std. Error 0.48 0.58 0.64 0.72 0.78 0.78 0.82 0.83 0.84 0.85 0.85
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Estimated Average Payoffs Linear Regression Line (b1=2.33)
 
Figure 4.4. Graph of Data for 3´10 Matrix With Red Force Degrading Information. 
 
In the 3´10 case, the Red force has an even greater advantage with 10 options to 
the Blue force’s 3, however, as the quantity of poor strategies for the Red force increases 
from 0 to 10, the outcome value increases linearly in favor of the Blue force (from 30.48 
for 0 bad strategies to 52.84 for all 10 bad strategies) for a total marginal gain of 22.36 
for the Blue force.  In this case, the Blue force requires that the Red force be subjected to 
as many as 9 bad column strategies before the Blue force is able to assume the advantage 
and overcome the Red force’s initial dominance.  These results show the significant 
benefits of superior information to forces that have large disadvantages.     
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Table 4.5. Data for 5´3 Matrix With Red Force Degrading Information. 
 
5x3 Statistics 0 Bad 1 Bad 2 Bad 3 Bad 
Mean 58.98 62.35 63.81 66.47
Median 59.00 63.00 65.00 67.00
Standard Deviation 18.43 18.75 20.71 20.82
Minimum 6.00 13.00 10.00 10.00
Maximum 97.00 99.00 99.00 99.00
Mean Std. Error 0.58 0.59 0.65 0.66
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Estimated Average Payoffs Cubic Regression Curve
 
Figure 4.5. Graph of Data for 5´3 Matrix With Red Force Degrading Information. 
 
In the 5´ 3 case, the Blue force is the more capable force with slightly more 
strategy choices when both forces possess correct information, however, as the quantity 
of incorrect information for the Red force increases from 0 column strategies to 3, the 
Blue force’s advantage increases even more (from 58.98 for 0 bad Red force strategies to 
66.47 for all 3 bad Red force strategies) for a small increase in the estimated average 
payoff battle of 7.49.  These results show that since the  Blue force has the advantage, the 
benefits of information superiority are small and a cubic relationship exists between 
estimated average payoffs and Red force bad information.  In Figure 4.5, a smaller scale 
(54 to 68) is used for the outcome values since the range of the estimated average payoff 





Table 4.6. Data for 5´5 Matrix With Red Force Degrading Information. 
 
5x5 Statistics 0 Bad 1 Bad 2 Bad 3 Bad 4 Bad 5 Bad 
Mean 50.49 51.87 54.18 56.09 57.60 60.15
Median 51.00 51.00 54.00 56.00 58.00 61.00
Standard Deviation 18.50 20.68 20.88 21.65 22.89 23.20
Minimum 6.00 8.00 6.00 6.00 4.00 6.00
Maximum 91.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00
Mean Std. Error 0.58 0.65 0.66 0.68 0.72 0.73
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Estimated Average Payoffs Linear Regression Line (b1=1.93)
 
Figure 4.6. Graph of Data for 5´5 Matrix With Red Force Degrading Information. 
 
The results of the 5´5 symmetric payoff matrix are similar to the findings for the 
3´3 case (see Table 4.2).  Each opposing force possesses the same number of strategies, 
therefore providing no advantage in force capability.  As the quantity of incorrect 
information for the Red force increases from 0 column strategies to 5, the Blue force’s 
advantage increases (from 50.49 for 0 bad Red force strategies to 60.15 for all 5 bad Red 
force strategies) for an increase in estimated average payoff of 9.69 for the Blue force, as 
compared to an increase from 48.66 to 59.99 for a marginal gain of 11.31 for the Blue 
force in the 3´3 matrix.  In Figure 4.6, the scale is reduced to (45 to 65) for the outcome 






Table 4.7. Data for 5´10 Matrix With Red Force Degrading Information. 
 
5x10 Statistics 0 Bad 1 Bad 2 Bad 3 Bad 4 Bad 5 Bad 6 Bad 7 Bad 8 Bad 9 Bad 10 Bad 
Mean 39.70 40.76 42.50 44.63 45.77 47.18 48.93 50.76 53.67 54.87 56.07
Median 39.00 40.00 41.00 43.00 44.00 46.00 46.00 49.00 54.00 55.00 57.00
Standard Deviation 18.06 18.87 20.47 21.75 22.67 23.46 24.13 24.67 25.97 25.62 25.55
Minimum 2.00 2.00 3.00 5.00 4.00 5.00 4.00 4.00 3.00 4.00 5.00
Maximum 91.00 98.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00
Mean Std. Error 0.57 0.60 0.65 0.69 0.72 0.74 0.76 0.78 0.82 0.81 0.81
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Estimated Average Payoffs Linear Regression Line (b1=1.70)
 
Figure 4.7. Graph of Data for 5´10 Matrix With Red Force Degrading Information. 
 
For the 5´10 payoff matrix, the Red force possesses more strategic options than 
the Blue force and is therefore more capable.  As the quality of all 10 of the column 
strategies is reduced, the advantage in battle is shifted to the Blue force by a value of 
16.37.  The Blue force assumes the advantage, when the Red force suffers a loss of 7 
correct courses of action.  The Blue force’s linear increase in battle outcome advantage 
for the 5´ 10 scenario of 16.37 is slightly less than its advantage in the 3´ 10 case for a 
value of 22.36 (see Table 4.4).  We also see that the slopes decrease, as the Blue force 
loses its advantage, from the 5´ 3 case to the 5´ 5 and 5´ 10 matrices.  These results 
suggest that the benefits of information superiority are greater in the case when a force 




Table 4.8. Data for 10´3 Matrix With Red Force Degrading Information. 
 
10x3 Statistics 0 Bad 1 Bad 2 Bad 3 Bad 
Mean 68.65 70.66 71.64 72.38
Median 70.00 72.00 73.00 74.00
Standard Deviation 15.82 16.04 16.69 17.37
Minimum 17.00 27.00 20.00 26.00
Maximum 98.00 99.00 99.00 99.00
Mean Std. Error 0.50 0.51 0.53 0.55
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Estimated Average Payoffs Quadratic Regression Curve
 
Figure 4.8. Graph of Data for 10´3 Matrix With Red Force Degrading Information. 
 
In the 10´3 case, the Blue force is even more capable over its opponent than in 
the 5´ 3 payoff matrix (see Table 4.5), by possessing twice as many strategic options.  
However, as the quantity of incorrect information fo r the Red force increases from 0 
column strategies to 3, the Blue force’s advantage of 3.73 in the 10´3 case increases less 
than that of the 5´3 matrix for a value of 7.49.  In Figure 4.8, the scale is reduced to (66 
to 73) for the payoff outcome values since the range of the payoff is less than 10.  The 
estimated averages payoffs and the increasing rows of superiority show a quadratic 
relationship.  Therefore, the quadratic term in the equation is statistically significant at 
the 0.10 level.  These results suggest that when a force has a significant advantage, there 




Table 4.9. Data for 10´5 Matrix With Red Force Degrading Information. 
 
10x5 Statistics 0 Bad 1 Bad 2 Bad 3 Bad 4 Bad 5 Bad 
Mean 59.60 60.79 62.13 62.64 64.50 65.85
Median 61.00 62.00 63.00 62.00 66.00 68.00
Standard Deviation 17.81 19.37 19.31 19.66 19.86 20.42
Minimum 10.00 17.00 16.00 10.00 15.00 13.00
Maximum 96.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00
Mean Std. Error 0.56 0.61 0.61 0.62 0.63 0.65
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Estimated Average Payoffs Linear Regression Line (b1=1.23)
 
Figure 4.9. Graph of 10´5 Matrix With Red Force Degrading Information. 
 
For the 10´5 payoff matrix, the Blue force is a more capable force than the Red 
force by possessing twice as many strategy choices with results similar to those observed 
in the 5´ 3 case (see Table 4.5).  As the quantity of poor choices increase for the Red 
force from 0 to 5, the Blue force’s payoff advantage of 6.25 improves approximately the 
same as the results of the 5´3 matrix by a value of 7.49, but considerably more than that 
observed in the 10´3 case for a value of 3.73 (see Table 4.8).  These results suggest that 
since the Blue force has less of an advantage in the 10´5 matrix than in the 10´3, 
information superiority has more added value  in the 10´5 matrix than in the 10´3 case.    
In Figure 4.9, the payoff outcome values scale is reduced to (56 to 68) since the range of 




Table 4.10. Data for 10´10 Matrix With Red Force Degrading Information. 
 
10x10 Statistics 0 Bad 1 Bad 2 Bad 3 Bad 4 Bad 5 Bad 6 Bad 7 Bad 8 Bad 9 Bad 10 Bad 
Mean 50.01 50.48 50.84 51.40 52.83 54.20 55.90 57.17 57.25 57.34 57.89
Median 50.00 51.00 51.00 50.00 51.00 53.00 56.00 57.00 58.00 57.00 59.00
Standard Deviation 19.51 21.15 20.23 22.05 21.70 22.26 22.78 23.83 23.96 23.76 24.47
Minimum 7.00 0.00 9.00 3.00 7.00 7.00 1.00 6.00 3.00 9.00 1.00
Maximum 93.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00
Mean Std. Error 0.62 0.67 0.64 0.70 0.69 0.70 0.72 0.75 0.76 0.75 0.77
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Estimated Average Payoffs Cubic Regression Curve
 
Figure 4.10. Graph of Data for 10´10 Matrix With Red Force Degrading Information. 
 
The 10´10 symmetric payoff matrix, like that of the 3´3 (see Table 4.2) and the 
5´5 (see Table 4.6), possesses the same number of strategies for opposing forces, 
therefore providing no advantages in force capability.  As the quantity of incorrect 
information for the Red force increases from 0% to 100%, the Blue force’s payoff 
advantage in the 10´10 matrix (7.88) is the least among the other two symmetric matrix 
scenarios (11.31 and 9.69 for the 3´ 3 and 5´ 5 matrices respectively).  The experiment 
shows a cubic relationship between the battle payoffs and the Red force’s increase in 
poor strategies since most of the benefits of information superiority occur between 3 and 
7 bad column choices by the Red force.  In Figure 4.10, the payoff outcome values scale 




C. REPLICATION OF BRACKEN AND DARILEK EXPERIMENT OF 
COMMON AND CORRECT KNOWLEDGE AND INTELLIGENCE 
WITH VARYING STRATEGY CHOICES 
1. Introduction 
This experiment considers the effects of opposing forces with common and 
correct knowledge with one of the opposing forces having intelligence, while varying the 
amount of strategies available for each force.  In their research, Braken and Darilek 
simulate one force having intelligence by allowing the Blue force prior knowledge of the 
Red force’s strategic intentions.  Their research is extended by simulating all 
combinations of asymmetric matrices (3´5, 3´10, 5´3, 5´10, 10´3 and 10´5), in addition 
to the symmetric matrices (3´3, 5´5 and 10´10). 
2. Analysis of Data and Graph 
 
Table 4.11. Data for Blue Force With Intelligence. 
 
Statistics 3x3 3x5 3x10 5x3 5x5 5x10 10x3 10x5 10x10 
Mean 57.14 49.60 39.61 70.80 63.75 56.53 83.52 79.18 74.73
Median 57.00 49.00 39.00 72.00 65.00 57.00 85.00 80.00 76.00
Standard Deviation 17.91 16.20 13.88 14.13 14.10 12.55 8.82 8.86 8.97
Minimum 7.00 9.00 4.00 22.00 17.00 14.00 38.00 39.00 38.00
Maximum 98.00 92.00 79.00 98.00 94.00 89.00 98.00 97.00 93.00
Mean Std. Error 0.57 0.51 0.44 0.45 0.45 0.40 0.28 0.28 0.28
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Figure 4.11. Graph of Data for Blue Force With Intelligence. 
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The presence of intelligence by the Blue force increases the payoff value in its 
favor in every matrix payoff scenario.  The Blue force’s advantage due to intelligence in 
the 10´10 case is 24.57,  payoff of 50.16 with no intelligence (see Table 4.1) and 74.73 
with intelligence (see Table 4.11), as compared to only an 8.21 advantage in the 3´ 3 
battle scenario.  This suggests that the more choices opposing forces have, the more 
important it is to have knowledge of an opponent’s strategic intentions.  The highest 
payoff occurs in the 10´3 matrix at 83.52, whereas the lowest is for the 3´10 case.  These 
results suggest that prior knowledge of the opposing force’s decisions provides the 
greatest benefit to the force with the highest number of options to counter with.   
D. VALUE OF VARIOUS LEVELS OF INFORMATION WITH 
INTELLIGENCE 
1. Introduction 
In this experiment, the Blue force possesses intelligence, thereby knowing the 
choice of strategy of the Red force, however, the effects of prior knowledge of the 
opponent’s strategic intentions are examined when combined with varying the opponents 
levels of correct information.  This is accomplished by altering the amounts of poor 
strategies available to the Red force by replacing correct information in the column 
strategies of the Red force with incorrect information (bad columns) from a separate 
matrix one column at a time (i.e., from 0% to 100%).  This experiment addresses the 
value of one force gaining information superiority, while also maintaining the advantage 
of intelligence and knowing the choices of strategy that the force with degrading 
information will ultimately make.   
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2. Analysis of Data and Graphs  
 
Table 4.12. Data for 3´3 Matrix With Blue Force Intel/Red Force Degrading Info. 
 
3x3 Statistics 0 Bad 1 Bad 2 Bad 3 Bad 
Mean 57.62 63.36 69.65 74.57
Median 59.00 65.00 73.00 79.00
Standard Deviation 18.28 20.48 20.08 19.20
Minimum 7.00 4.00 11.00 10.00
Maximum 96.00 99.00 99.00 99.00
Mean Std. Error 0.58 0.65 0.63 0.61
 






0 1 2 3











Estimated Average Payoffs Linear Regression Line (b1=5.71)
 
Figure 4.12. Graph of Data for 3´3 Matrix With Blue Force Intel/Red Force Degrading Info. 
 
For the symmetric 3´ 3 matrix, the payoff value increases in favor of the Blue 
force, as the quantity of incorrect column strategies for the Red force increases from 0 to 
3, by a value of 16.92 with Blue force intelligence (see Table 4.12) and 11.31 without 
intelligence (see Table 4.2).  The standard deviation for the payoff increases from 0 to 1 
bad columns by the Red force, and then decreases from 1 to 3.  These results suggest that 
the use of intelligence (i.e., through reconnaissance) allows the Blue force to improve the 
accuracy of its decision-making.  And that by knowing in advance the strategy choices of 
the Red force, the Blue force can discard less reliable information and focus on its 





Table 4.13. Data for 3´5 Matrix With Blue Force Intel/Red Force Degrading Info. 
 
3x5 Statistics 0 Bad 1 Bad 2 Bad 3 Bad 4 Bad 5 Bad 
Mean 50.04 55.57 59.64 64.22 69.09 74.93
Median 51.00 55.00 59.00 65.00 72.00 79.00
Standard Deviation 16.72 20.08 21.77 22.06 21.32 18.91
Minimum 3.00 4.00 7.00 4.00 2.00 14.00
Maximum 92.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00
Mean Std. Error 0.53 0.64 0.69 0.70 0.67 0.60
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Estimated Average Payoffs Linear Regression Line (b1=4.84)
 
Figure 4.13. Graph of Data for 3´5 Matrix With Blue Force Intel/Red Force Degrading Info. 
 
In the case of the 3´5 scenario, the Red force, with more strategy choices, has an 
advantage over the Blue force, which is significantly reduced by the Blue force’s use of 
intelligence.  Knowing the strategy choices of the Red force, the Blue force is able to 
improve the battle payoffs in its favor even while having less strategy choices itself.  As 
the quantity of incorrect column strategies for the Red force increases from 0 to 5, the 
outcome value of the battle increases further in favor of the Blue force by 24.89 with 
intelligence, as compared to 16.48 without intelligence (see Table 4.3).  The average 
increase in payoff in this scenario is from 41.28 (see Table 4.3) with no Blue force 
intelligence and both forces having common knowledge to 74.93 with the Blue force 






Table 4.14. Data for 3´10 Matrix With Blue Force Intel/Red Force Degrading Info. 
 
3x10 Statistics 0 Bad 1 Bad 2 Bad 3 Bad 4 Bad 5 Bad 6 Bad 7 Bad 8 Bad 9 Bad 10 Bad 
Mean 40.73 43.16 46.39 51.28 56.08 57.78 60.58 64.54 68.68 70.83 74.37
Median 41.00 42.00 43.00 48.00 54.00 54.00 60.00 66.00 74.00 76.00 78.00
Standard Deviation 14.03 17.98 20.36 22.42 23.63 24.12 23.85 24.26 23.29 21.40 18.78
Minimum 5.00 3.00 3.00 2.00 8.00 3.00 5.00 3.00 4.00 6.00 8.00
Maximum 78.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00
Mean Std. Error 0.44 0.57 0.64 0.71 0.75 0.76 0.75 0.77 0.74 0.68 0.59
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Estimated Average Payoffs Linear Regression Line (b1=3.43)
 
Figure 4.14. Graph of Data for 3´10 Matrix With Blue Force Intel/Red Force Degrading Info. 
 
In the 3´10 matrix, as the number of Red force incorrect column strategies 
increases from 0 to 10, the battle outcomes increase significantly in favor of the Blue 
force, by 33.64 with Blue force intelligence, and by 22.36 without the use of intelligence 
(see Table 4.4).  Table 4.4 shows that without intelligence, the payoff favors the Red 
force until 9 incorrect strategies are reached, whereas with intelligence, the Blue force 
assumes the advantage after the Red forces obtains only 3 bad choices.  The increase in 
payoff in this scenario is from 30.48 (see Table 4.4) with no Blue force intelligence to 
74.37 with the Blue force possessing both intelligence and information superiority.  
These results suggest that the presence of intelligence allows the Blue force to neutralize 
the Red force’s advantage of having more options and more capable forces at a faster 





Table 4.15. Data for 5´3 Matrix With Blue Force Intel/Red Force Degrading Info. 
 
5x3 Statistics 0 Bad 1 Bad 2 Bad 3 Bad 
Mean 70.83 74.92 79.53 82.96
Median 72.00 77.00 83.00 87.00
Standard Deviation 14.25 14.79 14.88 14.10
Minimum 14.00 25.00 17.00 24.00
Maximum 98.00 99.00 99.00 99.00
Mean Std. Error 0.45 0.47 0.47 0.45
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Estimated Average Payoffs Linear Regression Line (b1=4.10)
 
Figure 4.15. Graph of Data for 5´3 Matrix With Blue Force Intel/Red Force Degrading Info. 
 
In the case of the 5´3 matrix, the Blue force possesses a higher number of options 
and a more capable force.  However, when the Red force strategy choices are rendered 
100% incorrect and the Blue force gains information superiority, the estimated average 
payoff value increases from 58.98 (see Figure 4.5) to 82.96.  The relationship between 
outcome values and columns of Red force incorrect information is linear with a constant 
standard deviation of approximately 14.50.  In Figure 4.15, the payoff outcome values 
scale is reduced to (60 to 85).  These results suggest that since the Blue force is superior, 









Table 4.16. Data for 5´5 Matrix With Blue Force Intel/Red Force Degrading Info. 
 
5x5 Statistics 0 Bad 1 Bad 2 Bad 3 Bad 4 Bad 5 Bad 
Mean 64.14 68.28 71.83 76.23 79.32 82.58
Median 66.00 69.00 73.00 78.00 83.00 86.00
Standard Deviation 14.18 15.95 16.96 16.88 15.88 13.79
Minimum 14.00 17.00 14.00 12.00 19.00 23.00
Maximum 94.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00
Mean Std. Error 0.45 0.50 0.54 0.53 0.50 0.44
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Estimated Average Payoffs Linear Regression Line (b1=3.71)
 
Figure 4.16. Graph of Data for 5´5 Matrix With Blue Force Intel/Red Force Degrading Info. 
 
For the symmetric 5´ 5 matrix, the battle payoff values increase in favor of the 
Blue force, as the quantity of incorrect column strategies for the Red force increase from 
0 to 5, by a value of 18.44 with Blue force intelligence (see Table 4.16) and 9.66 without 
intelligence (see Table 4.6).  This suggests that the total increase in payoff due to 
information dominance for this scenario is from 50.49 (see Table 4.6) with no Blue force 
intelligence and both forces having common knowledge to 82.58 (see Table 4.16) with 
the Blue force possessing both intelligence and information superiority.  The relationship 
between outcome values and columns of Red force incorrect information is linear, and 
the standard deviations for the payoffs increase slightly from 0 to 2 bad column choices 






Table 4.17. Data for 5´10 Matrix With Blue Force Intel/Red Force Degrading Info. 
 
5x10 Statistics 0 Bad 1 Bad 2 Bad 3 Bad 4 Bad 5 Bad 6 Bad 7 Bad 8 Bad 9 Bad 10 Bad 
Mean 56.98 59.66 61.61 65.01 66.17 71.11 72.54 74.76 77.65 80.49 82.52
Median 58.00 60.00 61.00 64.00 64.00 72.00 74.00 78.00 82.00 85.00 87.00
Standard Deviation 12.46 15.25 16.99 17.32 18.40 18.53 18.85 18.17 17.64 16.14 14.55
Minimum 16.00 8.00 13.00 15.00 8.00 13.00 20.00 15.00 20.00 22.00 28.00
Maximum 85.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00
Mean Std. Error 0.39 0.48 0.54 0.55 0.58 0.59 0.60 0.57 0.56 0.51 0.46
 







0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10











Estimated Average Payoffs Linear Regression Line (b1=2.59)
 
Figure 4.17. Graph of Data for 5´10 Matrix With Blue Force Intel/Red Force Degrading Info. 
 
For the 5´ 10 matrix, the Blue force without intelligence (see Table 4.7) obtains 
the advantage after 7 bad Red force strategies, however, with the employment of 
intelligence, the Blue force has the advantage even at 0 bad Red force choices.  The total 
increase in payoff due to information dominance for this scenario is from 39.70 (see 
Table 4.7) with no Blue force intelligence and both forces having common knowledge to 
82.52 (see Table 4.17) with the Blue force possessing both intelligence and information 
superiority.  These results show the significant benefits of information dominance for a 









Table 4.18. Data for 10´3 Matrix With Blue Force Intel/Red Force Degrading Info. 
 
10x3 Statistics 0 Bad 1 Bad 2 Bad 3 Bad 
Mean 83.02 85.69 88.12 89.79
Median 84.00 87.00 90.00 92.00
Standard Deviation 9.18 9.25 9.21 9.17
Minimum 45.00 42.00 52.00 42.00
Maximum 99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00
Mean Std. Error 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29
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Estimated Average Payoffs Linear Regression Line (b1=2.27)
 
Figure 4.18. Graph of Data for 10´3 Matrix With Blue Force Intel/Red Force Degrading Info. 
 
For the 10´3 matrix, the Blue force possesses an inherent advantage in battle due 
to its higher number of strategies.  The additional employment of Blue force intelligence 
combined with Red force loss of correct decision-making information results in a Blue 
force payoff value increase from 83.02 to 89.79 for a payoff gain of only 6.77.  Similar to 
the results in the 5´3 matrix, since the Blue force is superior, intelligence provides little 
added benefit in advantage when combined with information superiority.  In Figure 4.18, 










Table 4.19. Data for 10´5 Matrix With Blue Force Intel/Red Force Degrading Info. 
 
10x5 Statistics 0 Bad 1 Bad 2 Bad 3 Bad 4 Bad 5 Bad 
Mean 79.62 82.09 84.52 86.12 88.45 90.33
Median 81.00 83.00 86.00 88.00 91.00 93.00
Standard Deviation 8.78 10.36 10.33 10.08 9.29 8.30
Minimum 40.00 39.00 41.00 38.00 50.00 50.00
Maximum 97.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00
Mean Std. Error 0.28 0.33 0.33 0.32 0.29 0.26
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Estimated Average Payoffs Linear Regression Line (b1=2.12)
 
Figure 4.19. Graph of Data for 10´5 Matrix With Blue Force Intel/Red Force Degrading Info. 
 
In the case of the 10´5 payoff matrix, the Blue force possesses less of an 
advantage over the Red force, as compared to the 10´3 case (see Table 4.18), since the 
disparity in the amount of force options is smaller.  For the 10´5 payoff matrix, the Red 
force’s loss of correct decision-making information results in a greater payoff gain for the 
Blue force of 10.17, (see Table 4.19), as compared to 6.77 for the 10´3 case (see Table 
4.18).  In the 10´5 matrix, the relationship between payoffs and increasing superiority is 
linear.  These results support that since the Blue force has less of an advantage in the 
10´5 case, the added value in payoff is greater in the 10´5 case than the value in the 







Table 4.20. Data for 10´10 Matrix With Blue Force Intel/Red Force Degrading Info. 
 
10x10 Statistics 0 Bad 1 Bad 2 Bad 3 Bad 4 Bad 5 Bad 6 Bad 7 Bad 8 Bad 9 Bad 10 Bad 
Mean 74.96 76.67 78.38 79.61 81.36 82.73 84.33 85.93 87.41 89.18 90.52
Median 76.00 77.00 79.00 80.00 82.00 83.00 86.00 89.00 90.00 92.00 93.00
Standard Deviation 8.55 9.76 10.72 11.33 11.30 11.29 11.39 11.06 10.46 9.46 8.10
Minimum 43.00 32.00 42.00 43.00 34.00 37.00 36.00 48.00 39.00 39.00 51.00
Maximum 94.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00
Mean Std. Error 0.27 0.31 0.34 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.35 0.33 0.30 0.26
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Estimated Average Payoffs Linear Regression Line (b1=1.55)
 
Figure 4.20. Graph of Data for 10´10 Matrix With Blue Force Intel/Red Force Degrading Info. 
 
In the 10´10 matrix scenario, both forces possess their highest levels of 
capability, and the payoff values favor the Blue force from 74.96 for 0 incorrect Red 
choices to 90.52 for all 10 incorrect Red force choices.  Looking across all cases where 
the Blue force has its maximum of 10 options (the 10´3, 10´5 and 10´10 matrices), the 
payoff value is at its highest of approximately 90.  This suggests that the higher the 
number of available choices a force has, the more added benefit the force may receive 
from intelligence combined with information superiority. 
E. VALUE OF VARYING CAPABILTIES OF FORCES 
1. Introduction 
This experiment addresses the effects of various levels of force capabilities on the 
outcome values of opposing forces in battle.  This scenario alters the boundaries for the 
random number distributions to represent forces with different levels of capability.  For 
each payoff value in the matrices, the Blue force is simulated as having both superior and 
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inferior capable forces.  Superior forces are simulated by changing the uniform 
distribution of the Blue force row choices from 50 to 100.  Similarly, the Blue force 
possesses varying levels of inferior capable forces by changing the boundaries of the 
uniform distribution of the row choices from 0 to 50.  The varying levels of superior and 
inferior capabilities for the Blue force are conducted by changing its row strategies from 
0% to 100%, one row at a time.  
2. Analysis of Data and Graphs  
 
Table 4.21. Data for 3´3 Matrix With Blue Force Superior Capabilities. 
 
3x3 Statistics 0 Superior 1 Superior 2 Superior 3 Superior 
Mean 49.80 67.11 71.37 74.15
Median 49.00 66.00 71.00 74.00
Standard Deviation 19.83 10.98 10.30 9.85
Minimum 2.00 50.00 50.00 53.00
Maximum 96.00 97.00 96.00 95.00
Mean Std. Error 0.63 0.35 0.33 0.31
 


















Estimated Average Payoffs Quadratic Regression Curve
 
Figure 4.21. Graph of Data for 3´3 Matrix With Blue Force Superior Capabilities. 
 
In this experiment, the 3´3 payoff matrix scenario produces the largest amount of 
gain in favor of the Blue force when it has 1 superior capability and levels off as the 
remaining 2 capabilities become superior.  The payoff increase for the use of the first 
superior row is 17.31.  The payoff increase for the use of the remaining second and third 
superior rows is only 7.04.  Figure 4.21 shows a quadratic relationship between the 
estimated average payoffs and the increasing rows of superiority.  These results suggest 
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that even though both forces have the same number of options, the presence of just 1 
superior option allows the Blue force to utilize its superior capabilities to create a 
significant advantage over the opposing Red force. 
 
Table 4.22. Data for 3´3 Matrix With Blue Force Inferior Capabilities. 
 
3x3 Statistics 0 Inferior 1 Inferior 2 Inferior 3 Inferior 
Mean 49.25 41.36 32.97 25.18
Median 48.00 40.00 31.00 25.00
Standard Deviation 19.44 18.47 15.27 9.96
Minimum 3.00 4.00 2.00 2.00
Maximum 96.00 94.00 89.00 48.00
Mean Std. Error 0.61 0.58 0.48 0.31
 




















Estimated Average Payoffs Linear Regression Line (b1= - 8.06)
 
Figure 4.22. Graph of Data for 3´3 Matrix With Blue Force Inferior Capabilities. 
 
For the 3´3 symmetric matrix, as the Blue force capabilities become increasingly 
inferior to those of the Red force, the outcome values decrease linearly in favor of the 
Red force from 49.25 to 25.18 for a total loss of 24.07.  The battle payoff standard 
deviation also decreases from 19.44 to 9.96, as the Blue force’s inferiority increases. 
These results suggest that as the Blue force’s choices become inferior, the advantage 







Table 4.23. Data for 3´5 Matrix With Blue Force Superior Capabilities. 
 
3x5 Statistics 0 Superior 1 Superior 2 Superior 3 Superior 
Mean 40.35 62.50 66.73 69.96
Median 40.00 61.00 66.00 70.00
Standard Deviation 17.65 8.92 9.04 8.63
Minimum 3.00 50.00 50.00 51.00
Maximum 89.00 92.00 96.00 94.00
Mean Std. Error 0.56 0.28 0.29 0.27
 

















Estimated Average Payoffs Quadratic Regression Curve
 
Figure 4.23. Graph of Data for 3´5 Matrix With Blue Force Superior Capabilities. 
 
In the case of the 3´5 matrix, where the Red force possesses slightly more 
strategic options and an initial force advantage of 40.35, the presence of the first superior 
capable Blue force provides the most benefit, as it produces an increase in payoff of 
22.15.  The increase in superiority of the remaining 2 Blue force options increases the 
Blue force’s advantage by only a value of 7.40.  Similar to the 3´ 3 case, the payoff 
increase has a quadratic relationship with the rows of superiority, and the results show 
that the presence of good information allows the Blue force to use its superior 









Table 4.24. Data for 3´5 Matrix With Blue Force Inferior Capabilities. 
 
3x5 Statistics 0 Inferior 1 Inferior 2 Inferior 3 Inferior 
Mean 41.34 33.19 25.80 19.97
Median 42.00 32.00 25.00 20.00
Standard Deviation 18.05 16.35 12.33 9.06
Minimum 2.00 4.00 1.00 0.00
 Maximum 89.00 84.00 75.00 43.00
Mean Std. Error 0.57 0.52 0.39 0.29
 



















Estimated Average Payoffs Linear Regression Line (b1= - 7.15) 
 
Figure 4.24. Graph of Data for 3´5 Matrix With Blue Force Inferior Capabilities. 
 
For the 3´5 payoff matrix, as the Blue force chooses between increasingly 
inferior capable force strategies, the total payoff decreases linearly for a total loss of 
21.37.  The payoff loss for the Blue force in the 3´5 matrix is less than that for the 3´3 
matrix which has a payoff loss of 24.07 (see Table 4.22).  From this data, we see that if a 
force has a disadvantage, the loss of effectiveness of these force capabilities reduces the 












Table 4.25. Data for 3´10 Matrix With Blue Force Superior Capabilities. 
 
3x10 Statistics 0 Superior 1 Superior 2 Superior 3 Superior 
Mean 30.33 58.52 62.19 65.08
Median 29.00 57.00 61.00 64.00
Standard Deviation 15.29 6.87 7.18 7.87
Minimum 1.00 50.00 50.00 50.00
Maximum 75.00 84.00 86.00 95.00
Mean Std. Error 0.48 0.22 0.23 0.25
 





















Estimated Average Payoffs Cubic Regression Curve
 
Figure 4.25. Graph of Data for 3´10 Matrix With Blue Force Superior Capabilities. 
 
For the 3´ 10 payoff matrix, the Red force initially has an even greater force 
advantage (30.33), as compared to 41.34 for the 3´5 case (see Table 4.24).  However, the 
battle outcome increases substantially in favor of the Blue force, after the addition of just 
1 superior capable force strategy, by a value 28.19.  The increase in payoff for the 
remaining second and third superior capable Blue force strategies is only 6.56.  These 
results show an even more dominant effect from the presence of the first good option, as 
the increase in payoff displays a cubic relationship with the rows of superiority for the 
Blue force.  The Blue force is, therefore, able to overcome a severe disadvantage if it 








Table 4.26. Data for 3´10 Matrix With Blue Force Inferior Capabilities. 
 
3x10 Statistics 0 Inferior 1 Inferior 2 Inferior 3 Inferior 
Mean 30.73 24.96 18.92 15.37
Median 30.00 24.00 18.00 14.00
Standard Deviation 15.38 12.85 9.81 7.95
Minimum 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
Maximum 80.00 71.00 49.00 40.00
Mean Std. Error 0.49 0.41 0.31 0.25
 





















Estimated Average Payoffs Linear Regression Line (b1= - 5.21)
 
Figure 4.26. Graph of Data for 3´10 Matrix With Blue Force Inferior Capabilities. 
 
In the case of the 3´10 matrix, where the Red force possesses significantly more 
strategies and thus has an inherent advantage over the Blue force, the reduction in force 
capability (from 0 inferior to all 3 inferior) by the Blue force, serves to further benefit the 
Red force with the lowest simulated outcome value of 15.37.  This decrease in payoff 
value is also reflected in the value of the average minimum outcome value of 0.50.  These 
results suggest that from Red’s perspective, bad rows increase the advantage linearly in 











Table 4.27. Data for 5´3 Matrix With Blue Force Superior Capabilities. 
 
5x3 Statistics 0 Superior 1 Superior 2 Superior 3 Superior 4 Superior 5 Superior 
Mean 58.72 70.69 72.89 75.76 77.57 78.81
Median 59.00 71.00 73.00 76.00 78.00 79.00
Standard Deviation 18.27 11.41 10.50 10.09 9.41 8.85
Minimum 9.00 50.00 50.00 53.00 54.00 56.00
Maximum 97.00 97.00 98.00 97.00 97.00 97.00
Mean Std. Error 0.58 0.36 0.33 0.32 0.30 0.28
 



















Estimated Average Payoffs Quadratic Regression Curve
 
Figure 4.27. Graph of Data for 5´3 Matrix With Blue Force Superior Capabilities. 
 
For the 5´3 matrix, the inherent advantage of the Blue force with more available 
options is improved by the addition of forces with superior capabilities.  The majority of 
the payoff increase occurs after the use of the first superior choice, which produces a gain 
of 11.97 and a near quadratic relationship.  For the remaining 4 superior capable courses 
of action, the increase is only 8.12 and displays a piece-wise linear relationship.  These 
results suggest that a force’s advantage after gaining one good option is less when it is the 







Table 4.28. Data for 5´3 Matrix With Blue Force Inferior Capabilities. 
 
5x3 Statistics 0 Inferior 1 Inferior 2 Inferior 3 Inferior 4 Inferior 5 Inferior 
Mean 58.54 53.63 50.65 42.64 36.00 29.15
Median 59.00 53.00 49.00 41.00 36.00 29.00
Standard Deviation 17.75 18.13 18.81 16.61 13.20 9.17
Minimum 8.00 5.00 10.00 6.00 6.00 3.00
Maximum 96.00 95.00 97.00 92.00 90.00 49.00
Mean Std. Error 0.56 0.57 0.59 0.53 0.42 0.29
 





















Estimated Average Payoffs Linear Regression Line (b1= - 5.94)
 
Figure 4.28. Graph of Data for 5´3 Matrix With Blue Force Inferior Capabilities. 
 
For the 5´ 3 matrix, the Blue force’s advantage of having two more strategic 
options is reduced to a value of 50.65 for 2 of 5 inferior choices and is further reduced in 
favor of the Red force when 5 of 5 choices are inferior to a value of 29.15.  From these 
results, we see that a force with a substantial advantage may protect itself by reducing the 
rate of payoff loss to the extent of having 2 inferior capabilities before its opponent may 












Table 4.29. Data for 5´5 Matrix With Blue Force Superior Capabilities. 
 
5x5 Statistics 0 Superior 1 Superior 2 Superior 3 Superior 4 Superior 5 Superior 
Mean 50.20 65.73 68.85 71.79 72.98 74.51
Median 50.00 65.00 68.00 72.00 73.00 74.00
Standard Deviation 18.50 10.40 9.64 9.56 9.22 9.43
Minimum 8.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 52.00 54.00
Maximum 94.00 96.00 93.00 97.00 96.00 96.00
Mean Std. Error 0.58 0.33 0.30 0.30 0.29 0.30
 


















Estimated Average Payoffs Quadratic Regression Curve
 
Figure 4.29. Graph of Data for 5´5 Matrix With Blue Force Superior Capabilities. 
 
For the 5´5 symmetric scenario, since neither side benefits by having an 
advantage in the number of strategies, the increase in the battle outcome is due only to 
the superiority of the Blue force options.  The majority of the Blue force payoff gain 
occurs after the addition of just 1 superior strategic option for an increase of 15.53.  The 
increase for the remaining 4 superior capable Blue force row options is only 8.78.  A 
quadratic or perhaps piece-wise linear relationship exists between the estimated average 
payoffs and the rows of Blue force superiority.  The results show that one good choice 






Table 4.30. Data for 5´5 Matrix With Blue Force Inferior Capabilities. 
 
5x5 Statistics 0 Inferior 1 Inferior 2 Inferior 3 Inferior 4 Inferior 5 Inferior 
Mean 49.61 45.10 41.39 34.34 29.03 24.80
Median 50.00 44.00 40.00 33.00 29.00 25.00
Standard Deviation 17.97 17.99 16.80 14.60 11.41 9.33
Minimum 6.00 4.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 2.00
Maximum 93.00 87.00 91.00 94.00 81.00 48.00
Mean Std. Error 0.57 0.57 0.53 0.46 0.36 0.29
 




















Estimated Average Payoffs Linear Regression Line (b1= - 5.12)
 
Figure 4.30. Graph of Data for 5´5 Matrix With Blue Force Inferior Capabilities. 
 
The results of the 5´ 5 symmetric payoff matrix are similar to those of the 3´ 3 
matrix (see Table 4.22).  As the Blue force capabilities become increasingly inferior to 
those of the Red force, the outcome values decrease linearly from 49.61 to 24.80 for a 
total loss of 24.81 in favor of the Red force, as compared to a loss of 24.07 for the 3´3 
matrix (see Table 4.22).  The battle payoff standard deviation also decreases from 17.97 












Table 4.31. Data for 5´10 Matrix With Blue Force Superior Capabilities. 
 
5x10 Statistics 0 Superior 1 Superior 2 Superior 3 Superior 4 Superior 5 Superior 
Mean 38.74 61.75 64.91 67.15 68.40 69.82
Median 38.00 61.00 64.00 67.00 68.00 69.00
Standard Deviation 17.69 8.21 8.29 8.58 8.77 8.86
Minimum 3.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 51.00 51.00
Maximum 86.00 89.00 88.00 93.00 89.00 90.00
Mean Std. Error 0.56 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.28 0.28
 


















Estimated Average Payoffs Cubic Regression Curve
 
Figure 4.31. Graph of Data for 5´10 Matrix With Blue Force Superior Capabilities. 
 
For the 5´ 10 matrix, where the Red force initially benefits by having twice as 
many courses of action as the Blue force, the Blue force neutralizes its disadvantage and 
changes the outcome payoff in its favor by the largest margin using only 1 superior 
capable option.  The increase in payoff for 1 superior capable Blue force option is 23.01, 
as compared to an increase of only 8.07 for the remaining 4 superior capable Blue force 
options.  This increase in payoffs displays a cubic or piece-wise linear relationship with 
the rows of superiority for the Blue force.  The results of the 5´10 matrix are similar to 
both the 3´ 5 and 3´ 10 matrices in that the use of just one superior capable option is 








Table 4.32. Data for 5´10 Matrix With Blue Force Inferior Capabilities. 
 
5x10 Statistics 0 Inferior 1 Inferior 2 Inferior 3 Inferior 4 Inferior 5 Inferior 
Mean 40.93 35.59 31.65 26.79 22.09 19.41
Median 41.00 34.00 30.00 26.00 21.00 19.00
Standard Deviation 17.76 16.71 15.05 12.64 10.25 8.71
Minimum 5.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 2.00 1.00
Maximum 84.00 81.00 81.00 73.00 62.00 40.00
Mean Std. Error 0.56 0.53 0.48 0.40 0.32 0.28
 



















Estimated Average Payoffs Linear Regression Line (b1= - 4.37)
 
Figure 4.32. Graph of Data for 5´10 Matrix With Blue Force Inferior Capabilities. 
 
In this experiment, the results for the 5´10 payoff matrix are similar to the results 
of both the 3´5 scenario (see Table 4.24) and the 3´10 scenario (see Table 4.26), where 
the payoff advantage is initially in favor of the Red force since in each case it has more 
options than the Blue force.  As the Blue force row options increase in inferiority from 
0% to 100%, the total Blue force payoff loss is 21.52 for the 5´10 case, as compared to a 





































Mean 68.21 74.57 77.15 78.27 79.65 80.17 81.70 82.25 83.28 82.93 83.72
Median 70.00 75.00 78.00 79.00 80.00 81.00 82.00 83.00 84.00 83.00 84.00
Standard 
Deviation 15.70 11.71 10.50 9.76 9.32 9.12 8.74 8.58 7.99 8.16 7.64
Minimum 20.00 50.00 50.00 52.00 55.00 55.00 56.00 57.00 59.00 59.00 61.00
Maximum 99.00 99.00 98.00 98.00 98.00 98.00 99.00 98.00 99.00 99.00 98.00
Mean Std. Error 0.50 0.37 0.33 0.31 0.29 0.29 0.28 0.27 0.25 0.26 0.24
 



















Estimated Average Payoffs Linear Regression Line (b1=1.27)
 
Figure 4.33. Graph of Data for 10´3 Matrix With Blue Force Superior Capabilities. 
 
In the 10´3 scenario, since the Blue force has the advantage, the addition of the 
Blue force superior row options have a relatively smaller affect on the increase in total 
payoff.  The relationship between payoffs and increasing superiority is linear.  In this 
case, the Blue force possesses 10 available options and receives a comparatively small 
gain in payoff after the first superior capable choice is included, for a gain of only 6.36.  
The total payoff after the remaining 9 superior capable Blue force row options are 
included is only 9.15.  These results suggest that for a force with a significant advantage, 

































Mean 69.14 67.47 65.46 63.58 61.03 58.60 55.48 50.63 45.23 38.87 34.07 
Median 70.00 69.00 67.00 64.00 62.00 58.00 55.00 48.00 42.00 38.00 34.00 
Standard Deviation 15.67 15.98 16.67 17.21 17.07 16.83 17.70 16.91 16.20 11.65 7.80 
Minimum 19.00 25.00 15.00 9.00 20.00 18.00 17.00 15.00 9.00 14.00 8.00 
Maximum 98.00 97.00 98.00 98.00 98.00 97.00 96.00 97.00 92.00 85.00 49.00 
Mean Std. Error 0.50 0.51 0.53 0.54 0.54 0.53 0.56 0.53 0.51 0.37 0.25 
 


















Estimated Average Payoffs Quadratic Regression Curve
 
Figure 4.34. Graph of Data for 10´3 Matrix With Blue Force Inferior Capabilities. 
 
In this scenario, the Blue force begins with a significant advantage over the Red 
force by having more than twice the number of available options.  However, as the 
capabilities of the Blue force row strategies begin to decrease, the estimated average 
payoff values show a quadratic relationship.  The advantage of the Blue force and the 
high number of available choices, prevent the Blue force from losing its advantage until 
the 8th inferior row choice is reached.  These results suggest that a force with a significant 
advantage is more capable of defending against and preventing the loss in payoff due to a 
decrease in force capability.  The greater the amount of choices, the more protection a 
































Mean 59.89 69.99 72.04 73.99 74.95 75.77 77.62 78.22 78.47 78.97 79.53 
Median 61.00 70.00 73.00 74.00 75.00 76.00 78.00 79.00 79.00 79.00 80.00 
Standard Deviation 17.53 11.71 10.99 10.48 9.96 9.43 9.25 9.27 9.26 9.27 8.89 
Minimum 15.00 50.00 50.00 51.00 53.00 53.00 54.00 57.00 54.00 58.00 55.00 
Maximum 97.00 96.00 96.00 97.00 97.00 97.00 97.00 97.00 97.00 97.00 98.00 
Mean Std. Error 0.55 0.37 0.35 0.33 0.31 0.30 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.28 
 



















Estimated Average Payoffs Linear Regression Line (b1=1.50)
 
Figure 4.35.  Graph of Data for 10´5 Matrix With Blue Force Superior 
Capabilities. 
 
In the 10´5 payoff matrix, the Blue force has an initial advantage (58.89) over the 
Red force by having twice as many available options.  As a result, the gain in payoff as 
the Blue force receives superior row options is minimal.  For example, the payoff gain 
provided by the addition of 1 superior row capability is only 10.10 and the payo ff gain 
for the remaining 9 superior row capabilities is even less at 9.54.  The relationship 
between payoffs and increasing superiority is linear or piece-wise linear after the change 
point of the first superior row option.  Similar to the 10´3 and 5´3 matrices, these results 
suggest that the Blue force’s benefit of one good option is comparatively less when it is 































Mean 59.21 58.47 56.34 54.13 52.41 48.87 45.66 42.42 37.23 32.04 29.08 
Median 60.00 59.00 57.00 54.00 52.00 47.00 44.00 40.00 37.00 32.00 29.00 
Standard Deviation 17.59 17.72 18.15 17.57 17.79 17.37 16.65 15.87 13.23 10.20 8.64 
Minimum 17.00 11.00 13.00 12.00 10.00 11.00 7.00 10.00 9.00 6.00 7.00 
Maximum 96.00 96.00 96.00 95.00 94.00 93.00 91.00 90.00 88.00 72.00 48.00 
Mean Std. Error 0.56 0.56 0.57 0.56 0.56 0.55 0.53 0.50 0.42 0.32 0.27 
 





















Estimated Average Payoffs Quadratic Regression Curve
 
Figure 4.36. Graph of Data for 10´5 Matrix With Blue Force Inferior Capabilities. 
 
In the 10´3 payoff matrix (see Table 4.34), the Red force assumes the advantage 
as the 8th Blue force row choice becomes inferior.  In the case of the 10´5 scenario, the 
payoff value drops off at a faster rate, and the Red force assumes the advantage after only 
the 5th Blue force row choice becomes inferior.  As the capabilities of the Blue force row 
strategies begin to decrease, the estimated average payoff values show a quadratic 
relationship.  These results show that in the 10´5 case, since the Blue force possesses less 
of an advantage than that of the 10´3, the Blue force becomes more susceptible to 


































Mean 50.24 66.23 68.03 70.30 70.87 72.03 72.06 73.24 73.60 74.50 74.53 
Median 50.00 65.00 67.00 70.00 71.00 72.00 72.00 74.00 74.00 75.00 74.00 
Standard Deviation 18.85 10.30 9.90 10.12 10.15 9.53 9.71 9.83 9.71 9.71 9.72 
Minimum 0.00 50.00 50.00 51.00 51.00 52.00 52.00 53.00 54.00 55.00 54.00 
Maximum 89.00 92.00 92.00 93.00 91.00 98.00 93.00 96.00 95.00 94.00 96.00 
Mean Std. Error 0.60 0.33 0.31 0.32 0.32 0.30 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 
 


















Estimated Average Payoffs Cubic Regression Curve
 
Figure 4.37. Graph of Data for 10´10 Matrix With Blue Force Superior Capabilities. 
 
In the 10´10 symmetric payoff matrix, neither force has an advantage in the 
number of courses of actions.  As the Blue force options increase in superiority from 0% 
to 100%, there is a big first step and a cubic relationship with the payoff values.  The gain 
at 1 superior option has a value of 15.99.  The increase for the remaining 9 superior 
capable options is only 8.30 and displays a flat, piece-wise linear relationship with the  
payoff values.  Therefore, as the number of available choices increases, the less of an 
influence each additional superior capability has after the addition of the first superior 
option.  Looking across all of the cases of superior Blue forces, a clear pattern emerges.  
A piece-wise linear relationship exists with a change point at 1 superior row.  Therefore, 































Mean 49.83 48.24 46.29 44.15 40.94 39.66 35.53 32.00 29.12 26.56 24.21 
Median 50.00 48.00 46.00 44.00 40.00 39.00 34.00 32.00 29.00 26.00 24.00 
Standard Deviation 19.47 18.94 19.02 18.70 17.55 17.26 14.96 13.73 11.63 10.13 10.01 
Minimum 5.00 6.00 7.00 8.00 5.00 4.00 6.00 6.00 4.00 6.00 4.00 
Maximum 92.00 90.00 86.00 85.00 87.00 84.00 78.00 84.00 68.00 53.00 46.00 
Mean Std. Error 0.62 0.60 0.60 0.59 0.55 0.55 0.47 0.43 0.37 0.32 0.32 
 




















Estimated Average Payoffs Linear Regression Line (b1= - 2.69)
 
Figure 4.38. Graph of Data for 10´10 Matrix With Blue Force Inferior Capabilities. 
 
The 10´10 payoff matrix results resemble those of both the 3´3 and 5´5 
symmetric cases.  In each of the three scenarios, each opposing force possesses equal 
numbers of force capabilities, therefore, neither side has an advantage.  As the quality of 
all of the Blue force’s capabilities are reduced to being inferior to the Red force, the value 
of the game depreciates from 49.83 to 24.21, as compared to 49.25 to 25.18 for the 3´3 
matrix (see Table 4.22) and 49.61 to 24.80 for the 5´5 case (see Table 4.30).  Looking 
across all of the scenarios, we see the emerging pattern that as the number of inferior 
capable rows increases, the payoff advantage increases linearly in favor of the Red force. 
F. VALUE OF VARYING LEVELS OF INFORMATION USING NORMAL 
DISTRIBUTION PAYOFFS 
1. Introduction 
This experiment extends the methodology used by Bracken and Darilek by 
generating payoffs for each matrix using the truncated normal distribution with a mean of 
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50, a standard deviation of sqrt(1002/12) = 28.87, a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 
100. 
2. Analysis of Data and Graph 
Table 4.39. Data for Both Forces Using Normal Distribution. 
 
 
Statistics 3x3 3x5 3x10 5x3 5x5 5x10 10x3 10x5 10x10 
Mean 49.99 42.37 35.18 56.46 49.62 41.81 63.77 56.74 49.73
Median 51.00 42.00 35.00 56.00 49.00 41.00 64.00 56.00 50.00
Standard Deviation 14.38 13.14 12.60 13.68 13.33 13.40 12.34 13.51 13.82
Minimum 9.00 10.00 2.00 13.00 13.00 11.00 28.00 24.00 13.00
Maximum 95.00 78.00 69.00 94.00 84.00 93.00 94.00 92.00 86.00
Mean Std. Error 0.45 0.42 0.40 0.43 0.42 0.42 0.39 0.43 0.44
 
Blue Force  vs  Red Force                                   


















Est. Avg. Payoffs Normal Distribution
Est. Avg. Payoffs Uniform Distribution
 
Figure 4.39. Graph of Data for Both Forces Using Normal Distribution. 
 
The results of the data simulating opposing forces in battle with common and 
correct information using the normal distribution are quite similar to the outcomes for the 
uniform distribution from 0 to 100 (see Table 4.1).  These estimated average payoffs are 
especially close in value for the symmetric matrices.  For the 3´ 3 payoff matrix, the 
value for the normal distribution is 49.99 (48.93 for uniform distribution).  In the case of 
the 5´5 matrix, the value for the normal distribution is 49.62 (49.02 for the uniform 
distribution).  And for the 10´10 matrix, the value for the normal distribution is 49.73 
(50.16 for the uniform distribution).   
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The estimated average payoff values for the normal distribution are greater than 
those of the uniform distribution in the matrix scenarios where the Red force has the 
higher number of options and the more capable forces.  For example, for the 3´5 matrix, 
the value for the normal distribution is slightly higher at 42.37 (41.11 for the uniform 
distribution).  For the 3´ 10 matrix, the value for the normal distribution is greater at 
35.18 (30.28 for the uniform distribution).  And in the case of the 5´10 matrix, the value 
for the normal distribution is 41.81 (40.21 for the uniform distribution). 
The estimated average payoff values for the normal distribution are lower than 
those of the uniform distribution in the matrix scenarios where the Blue force has the 
higher number of options and the more capable forces.  In the 5´3 matrix, the value for 
the normal distribution is 56.46 (58.32 for the uniform distribution).  For the 10´3 matrix, 
the value for the normal distribution is 63.77 (68.65 for the uniform distribution).  And 
for the 10´5 matrix, the value for the normal distribution is 56.74 (59.72 for the uniform 
distribution).   
The average standard deviation for the game payoffs using the normal 
distribution, 13.35, is less than that of the uniform distribution, 17.80.  Additionally, the 
minimum outcome values for the normal distribution are greater than the outcome values 
for the uniform distribution.  For the normal distribution, the minimum payoffs for the 
3´3, 3´ 5 and 3´ 10 matrices are 9.00, 10.00 and 2.00, respectively.  In the case of the 
uniform distribution, the outcome payoffs decrease for the 3´ 3, 3´ 5 and 3´ 10 matrices 
with values of 4.00, 2.00 and 0.00, respectively.  Similarly, for the 5´ 3, 5´ 5 and 5´ 10 
matrices using the normal distribution, the minimum payoffs are 13.00, 13.00 and 11.00, 
respectively.  In the case of the uniform distribution, the outcome payoffs decrease for the 
5´3, 5´5 and 5´10 matrices with values of 10.00, 6.00 and 3.00, respectively.  Finally, 
for the 10´3, 10´5 and 10´10 matrices using the normal distribution, the minimum game 
values are 28.00, 24.00 and 13.00, respectively, whereas the minimum values for the 
uniform distribution for the same matrices are 24.00, 17.00 and 0.00, respectively. 
These results suggest that when a “tighter” distribution (truncated normal) is used 
to generate payoff values, the size of the effects of information superiority decreases. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. OBSERVATIONS 
The conceptual framework of the Armed Force’s Joint Vision serves as the basis 
for focusing the strengths of each individual service component to exploit the full array of 
available capabilities.  This thesis provides several insights into one of the most important 
underlying concepts of the Joint Vision, decision superiority, and the value of 
information in defining force advantage and in determining how decisions and choices of 
actions may affect payoffs in battle.  Numerous experiments were conducted and over 
100,000 evaluations of matrix game simulations were performed in order to ensure that 
the estimated average payoffs are as accurate as possible over a variety of situations. 
The first experiment observes the effects of opposing forces in battle when 
possessing asymmetric strategy choices.  The experiment demonstrates that if opposing 
forces possess options with equivalent strategic capabilities, the payoff advantage is 
determined by the quantity of choices from which to choose.  The payoff value increases 
linearly in favor of the force with the maximum number of choices.  This suggests that 
flexible forces with more options have a significant advantage even when they do not 
possess advantages in payoff or information superiority.   
The second experiment addresses the value of varying levels of information 
superiority between asymmetric opposing forces.  The degree of advantage in payoff for 
the force with superior information is determined by the amount of choices and the 
quantity of bad information.  When a force possesses significantly fewer strategic 
options, more superior information is required to assume the payoff advantage, however, 
information tends to have a greater value and provide a larger payoff gain for less capable 
forces with fewer choices.  These results suggest that when a force has a significant 
disadvantage, there is substantial added value to information superiority.  For a force 
having more flexibility and more strategies, significantly less information is required to 
affect an advantage in payoff, and superior information is less valuable and produces a 
smaller marginal gain for these more capable forces.  This suggests that when a force 
already possesses an advantage, there is less benefit received from superior information.  
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Also in this experiment, a pattern exists in the results of the standard deviations.  Looking 
across all cases, as the number of bad information choices increases for the Red force, the 
spread in payoffs increases.  
The third experiment considers the effects of intelligence on the payoffs of 
asymmetric opposing forces with common levels of information.  The results of the 
experiment demonstrate that intelligence provides the greatest payoff increase when a 
force possesses its maximum number of strategic options combined with the opposition 
also having its maximum number of choices.  In the case where few options are available 
for opposing forces, intelligence provides minimal benefits to payoff advantage.  This 
suggests that the more choices opposing forces have, the more important it is to have 
knowledge of an opponent’s strategic intentions.  Additionally, since intelligence 
provides the highest payoff in favor of the force with the most number of options, it is 
clear that when a force has a significant advantage, the more added benefit there might be 
from intelligence.  
The fourth experiment examines the combined affects of both intelligence and 
information superiority, also known as information dominance, on the payoffs of 
opposing asymmetric forces.  The results suggest that the presence of intelligence 
enhances the benefits of information superiority and allows forces to overcome their 
disadvantages at a faster rate, with less superior information.  The experiment also shows 
that intelligence combined with information superiority produces the greatest benefit for 
the force with the largest disadvantage when its opposing fo rce possesses significantly 
more capabilities.  In contrast, the results show that little added benefit is received from 
the use of intelligence and information superiority by forces with significant advantages.  
The data also infers that the higher the number of available strategic choices a force has, 
the more added value the force may receive from information dominance. 
The fifth experiment shows the effects on the payoffs of varying levels of 
superiority and inferiority in the capabilities of asymmetric forces.  In the case of 
opposing forces when one force has increasingly superior capabilities, the use of the first 
superior option provides the largest payoff gain and levels off thereafter.  In fact, the first 
superior option provides the highest advantage to the force with the fewest choices 
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against the most capable opposing force, therefore, making it possible for a force to 
overcome a severe disadvantage if it knows its most capable options.  These results 
suggest that good information allows a force to utilize its better options even if only few 
exist.  Therefore, looking across all cases of increasing superior capabilities, we see that 
if a force is aware of it, just one good option is all that it may need to gain the advantage 
in payoff. 
In the case of opposing forces when one force has increasingly inferior 
capabilities, we see that the loss of force capability or the increase in inferiority reduces 
the estimated average payoff by the greatest margin for the force with the advantage.  
Meaning that when a force has its maximum number of choices available, while its 
opponent possesses its minimum number of options, the effects of inferiority have the 
largest impact on the payoff value of the battle.  However, a force possessing a 
significant advantage with a high number of available choices, may reduce the rate at 
which inferiority impacts payoff loss by providing more options from which to choose, 
thereby, providing protection against the threat of bad information.  The larger the 
advantage, the more the protection exists against just a few bad strategies, whereas if few 
options are present, inferiority has a higher negative impact on each strategy loss.  These 
results suggest that a force with a significant advantage is more capable of defending 
against and preventing the loss in payoff due to a decrease in force capability.  The 
greater the amount of choices, the more protection a force may gain against inferior 
options. 
The sixth experiment uses normal distribution payoffs to compare the estimated 
average outcome values to those of the uniform distribution.  This test suggests that the 
conclusions may be robust to other symmetric payoff distributions.  The data also implies 
that when a “tighter” distribution (truncated normal) is used to generate payoff values, the 
size of the effects of information superiority decreases.  These results show that different 
distributions have an impact on the outcome values. 
The fundamental conclusion is that the benefits of various levels of information 
are dependent on numerous factors that affect a decision-maker’s choice of strategy and 
ultimately the payoff of battle.  These experiments reflect the effect of knowledge and 
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capabilities on the likelihood of a successful outcome.  Some of the results prove to be 
intuitive and others counter- intuitive, and it is the goal of this thesis to bring to the 
attention of the reader, the level of influence that the control of information has on the 
determination and decisiveness of victory.   
Also implicit in these experiments is the notion that information superiority, 
dominance and their affects on payoffs result from dynamic interactions between two 
sides.  This concept is intended to condition military commanders and decision-makers to 
understand that it is not satisfactory to calculate and consider the effects of our own 
strategic intentions, but an understanding of those of our opposition, may in some cases 
provide a more accurate comprehension of the course of battle and serve to further 
increase the probability of victory in our favor. 
B. STUDY LIMITATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
Extensions of the work previously performed by Bracken and Darilek on the 
value of information, and the conceptual dimensions as to how much information 
superiority is satisfactory to provide an advantage over one’s opponent is necessary.  
Since Bracken and Darilek’s research is limited to the assumption that each force either 
possesses correct or incorrect information and that the knowledge of the decisions of an 
opponent are either known or unknown, this research extends this concept by considering 
the value of information superiority, and its affects on the outcomes of decision-making 
as the information is varied between totally correct and incorrect.  There exist numerous 
other methods of simulating the dynamics of varying the level information superiority.  
One example is to simulate the attrition of information.  This is accomplished by deleting 
the payoff values within individual row or column strategies in order to represent either 
the loss of access to good information or a force’s ability to prevent its opposition’s use 
of that information. 
In addition to varying the type and amount of information available to the two 
sides, the effects of opponents possessing different numbers of potential courses of action 
is also considered.  Bracken and Darilek only use symmetric 3´ 3, 5´ 5 and 10´10 
matrices and this thesis simulates battles using 3´ 5, 3´ 10, 5´ 3, 5´ 10, 10´3 and 10´5 
matrices in order to represent the probabilities of victory or payoffs for asymmetric forces 
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having different amounts of strategies and choices from which to choose.  In order to 
more accurately model present military strategies, operations and battle scenarios, there 
would be even more accurate and applicable data if the size of the payoff matrices 
actually represent the number of choices that current forces in operation possess in 
several diverse scenarios.  These strategies, instead of having numerical indices, should 
have labels with actual names of applicable strategies and the capabilities of these labels 
should be reflected in the payoffs.  For example, for a Blue force row strategy 
representing airpower, the payoffs within that row should contain values that represent 
our threat capabilities at that particular time for that specific battle scenario.   
In their research, Bracken and Darilek develop their payoffs using random 
numbers distributed uniformly between the boundaries of 0 and 100.  In this following 
research, we also predominantly use a uniform distribution.  Since the assumption that 
payoffs follow a uniform distribution is highly questionable, it is recommended that 
additional random number distributions be used to develop payoffs that are robust in 
exploring game scenarios that are representative of the dynamic interactions of actual 
combat. 
The linear, quadratic and cubic regression models used to determine the local 
relationships between varying levels of information and battle outcomes ignore the fact 
that the payoffs are known to be bound between 0 and 100.  An area for further study is 
to fit more realistic functional forms that use these constraints. 
Since this thesis follows Bracken and Darilek by generating payoffs using random 
numbers to compute the average of 1,000 trials for each battle simulation, a 
recommendation is to use all 1,000 data points in fitting the models.  This method will 
allow a more accurate identificaton of statistically significant effects than the ecological 
regression used in this thesis. 
Our results suggest that flexib le forces (i.e., those with more options) have a 
significant advantage even when they have no information or payoff advantage.  A 
recommendation is to assess the effects of order statistics on the payoff values.  For 
example, as the payoff value changes under various conditions, to what extent are these 
effects due to a force having more courses of actions or due to the fact that the range of a 
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sample of 10 options (more available courses of actions) is greater than that of a sample 
of 3 (few courses of actions)?  And, how is the value of the game related to the order 
statistics of the sample. 
In addition to two-person zero sum games, other types of games may provide 
insight into the value of varying levels of information for opposing forces.  One such 
example is Blotto Games, named after the legendary Colonel Blotto, who was tasked 
with dividing his attacking force among several forts without knowing how the defenders 
were distributed.[Reference 6]  In the generalization, each side has a certain total force 
that must be divided among the variable (n) “areas”.  The payoff is a sum of payoffs in 
each area, and the payoff in each area depends only on the forces assigned to that area.  
An example application for Colonel Blotto games is the case where “areas” are specified 
communication and intelligence assets that provide the ability to obtain superior 
information and knowledge of opposing forces and their decisions.[Reference 6]   
Sequential games provide an additional method of assessing the value of 
information between opposing forces since actual battle scenarios will include sequential 
decision-making where opposing force commander’s will be required to assess the game 
payoffs and perform further courses of action after their opponent responds to the initial 
round of strategy choices.  Some of the benefits of sequential games are that decision-
makers will be allowed to base decisions and choices of actions on tendencies and lessons 
learned from previous successful moves and victories as well as from memory of 
incorrect decisions and losses.   
The listed recommendations for further research are only a sample of the wide 
range of topics that are available and necessary in providing further guidance and 
understanding for the role of Armed Force’s commanders and decision-makers in 
maintaining the assurance of information superiority, as we progress into the Information 
Age future of Joint Vision 2020. 
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